Law Commons^™

Mapp V. Ohio: The First Shot Fired In The Warren Court's Criminal Procedure 'Revolution', Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

Although Earl Warren ascended to the Supreme Court in 1953, when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we really mean the movement that got underway half-way through the Chief Justice's sixteen-year reign. It was the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio, overruling Wolf v. Colorado and holding that the state courts had to exclude illegally seized evidence as a matter of federal constitutional law, that is generally regarded as having launched the so-called criminal procedure revolution.

When Constitutional Worlds Colide: Resurrecting The Framers' Bill Of Rights And Criminal Procedure, George C. Thomas Iii

Michigan Law Review

For two hundred years, the Supreme Court has been interpreting the Bill of Rights. Imagine Chief Justice John Marshall sitting in the dim, narrow Supreme Court chambers, pondering the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in United States v. Burr. Aaron Burr was charged with treason for planning to invade the Louisiana Territory and create a separate government there. To help prepare his defense, Burr wanted to see a letter written by General James Wilkinson to President Jefferson. In ruling on Burr's motion to compel disclosure, Marshall departed from the literal language of the Sixth Amendment - …

Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein

Michigan Law Review

The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …

The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures In Dickerson, Paul G. Cassell

Michigan Law Review

Where's the rest of the opinion? That was my immediate reaction to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, delivered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my incredulity grew.

Arrest, James Boyd White

Book Chapters

The constitutional law of arrest governs every occasion on which a government officer interferes with an individual’s freedom, from full-scale custodial arrests at one end of the spectrum to momentary detentions at the other. Its essential principle is that a court, not a police officer or other executive official, shall ultimately decide whether a particular interference with the liberty of an individual is justified. The court may make this judgment either before an arrest, when the police seek a judicial warrant authorizing it, or shortly after an arrest without a warrant, in a hearing held expressly for that purpose. The …

Linkletter, Shott, And The Retroactivity Problem In Escobedo, J. Alan Galbraith

Michigan Law Review

Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court Term, decisions promulgating new constitutional rules were applied retroactively as a matter of course to final convictions. While dissents occasionally criticized the Court's failure to discuss the retroactive impact of a new constitutional rule, the potential effect upon final convictions of any single rule was not sufficiently acute to justify a departure from the normal grant of retroactivity. But the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio; which abruptly overturned Wolf v. Colorado and brought into doubt final state convictions resting upon illegally seized evidence admitted in reliance upon Wolf, caused courts and …

Evidence Illegally Seized By Private Persons Excluded From Criminal Prosecution--People V. Mccomb, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

At common law, illegally seized evidence was admissible on the theory that the nature of the seizure did not necessarily affect the probative value of the evidence. However, in 1914 the United States Supreme Court, in order to protect the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, adopted a rule excluding from federal courts evidence illegally seized by federal officials. In 1961, the scope of this rule was extended by Mapp v. Ohio, which held that all evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in state courts. However, the Mapp doctrine applies only …

The Line Between Federal And State Court Jurisdiction, Leslie A. Anderson

Michigan Law Review

From the beginning of this nation, there have been controversies involving the division of jurisdiction between federal and state courts. Often, these controversies have centered on the diversity of citizenship provision of the federal constitution. Today, however, the more poignant question is whether any division of jurisdiction between the federal and state systems retains logical bases.

Although myriad developments have relevancy with respect to this question, I have here focused upon two of the more important ones: the increasing overlap of subject matter being litigated in federal and state courts and the growing uniformity of standards to be applied in …

Constitutional Law-Search And Seizure-Retrospective Application Of Mapp V. Ohio, Timothy D. Wittlinger

Michigan Law Review

On February 15, 1960, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for simple burglary. The conviction was obtained through the use of evidence unlawfully seized from petitioner in violation of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. In December 1961 the District Court for the Parish of West Feliciana denied petitioner's writ of habeas corpus filed after the Supreme Court decision of Mapp v. Ohio, which forbade introduction at state trials of evidence seized by state officers in violation of the fourth amendment. The denial of the writ was affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and certiorari was …

Betts V. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right To Counself And Due Process Values, Yale Kamisar

Michigan Law Review

I am quite distressed by talk that the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio "suggests by analogy" that the Court may now overrule Betts v. Brady. For whether one talks about the fourth or the sixth amendment, there is much to be said for Justice Harlan's dissenting views in Mapp. "[W]hatever configurations ... have been developed in the particularizing federal precedents" should not be "deemed a part of 'ordered liberty,' and as such ... enforceable against the States .... [W]e would not be true to the Fourteenth Amendment were we merely to stretch the general principle [ of …

Some Problems Of Evidence Before The Labor Arbitrator, R. W. Fleming

Michigan Law Review

Legal rules of evidence do not, of course, apply before the labor arbitrator. This is not surprising since such rules were developed in connection with jury trials, and do not apply strictly in any tribunal but a jury-court. The whole theory of the arbitration tribunal is that it is composed of experts who repeatedly inquire into a relatively homogeneous kind of cases. Exclusionary rules are hardly required as a precautionary measure. Indeed, as the late Harry Shulman said in his classic Oliver Wendell Holmes lecture at Harvard in 1955, "The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator will hear …