Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law
What Is "New"?: Defining "New Judgement" After Magwood, Patrick Cothern
What Is "New"?: Defining "New Judgement" After Magwood, Patrick Cothern
Michigan Law Review
Habeas corpus petitioners must navigate the procedural barriers of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) before courts consider their petitions on the merits. Among the barriers imposed is a general prohibition on “second or successive” habeas petitions, meaning a petitioner who previously filed a habeas petition may not bring another, with limited exceptions. One such exception, recognized by the Supreme Court in Magwood v. Patterson, allows for a second habeas petition after the petitioner obtains a “new judgment.” Magwood and AEDPA, however, left the term “new judgment” undefined. This Note summarizes the history of habeas corpus in the …
The Demise Of Habeas Corpus And The Rise Of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations On The Development And Enforcement Of Constitutional Rights And Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, Stephen R. Reinhardt
Michigan Law Review
The collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal era. Once hailed as the Great Writ, and still feted with all the standard rhetorical flourishes, habeas corpus has been transformed over the past two decades from a vital guarantor of liberty into an instrument for ratifying the power of state courts to disregard the protections of the Constitution. Along with so many other judicial tools meant to safeguard the powerless, enforce constitutional rights, and hold the government accountable, habeas has been slowly eroded by a …
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Michigan Law Review
The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, for judges to achieve “sensible” resolutions of real-world disputes—by which Judge Posner means “in a way that can be explained in ordinary language and justified as consistent with the expectations of normal people” (p. 354)—they must be able to navigate the world’s complexity successfully. To apply legal rules correctly and (where judicial lawmaking is called for) to formulate legal rules prudently, judges must understand the causal mechanisms and processes that undergird complex systems, and they must be able to draw sound factual …
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Michigan Law Review
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Michigan Law Review
In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …
The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter
The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter
Michigan Law Review
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I examine why the conceptual problem of who or what is "the State" is so intractable. In Part II, I present the historical evidence that establishes beyond doubt the pedigree and meaning of the phrase under color of law. I explain why Frankfurter would have indulged in such an obvious historical error to take the position he did. I suggest that, as was the case with the invention of modem standing doctrine, Frankfurter was here engaged in a stealthy, anachronistic campaign against the jurisprudence of the Lochner era - attempting to …
Legal Interpretation And A Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan Association V. Blaisdell, Charles A. Bieneman
Legal Interpretation And A Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan Association V. Blaisdell, Charles A. Bieneman
Michigan Law Review
The approaches of Hughes and Sutherland are but two extremes in constitutional interpretation. Though only two results were possible in the case - either the Act was constitutional or it was not - there are more than two methods by which an interpreter could reach those results. This Note explores possible ways of deciding Blaisdell, using the case as a vehicle for delimiting the boundaries of a positive constitutional command. As a sort of empirical investigation of legal philosophy, the Note examines how various interpretive theories affect an interpreter's approach to the case, and the results these theories might …
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Michigan Law Review
Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the government's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. Defendant Amorous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the admitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which criminalizes the knowing …
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Michigan Law Review
In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …
The Availability Of Jury Trials In Copyright Infringement Cases: Limiting The Scope Of The Seventh Amendment, Andrew W. Stumpff
The Availability Of Jury Trials In Copyright Infringement Cases: Limiting The Scope Of The Seventh Amendment, Andrew W. Stumpff
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues that statutory copyright damages are properly regarded as equitable and hence that no right to a jury trial exists in cases brought to recover such damages. More generally, the Note maintains that the seventh amendment's distinction between equitable and legal causes of action has produced irrational consequences, and proposes that "legal" issues be defined narrowly so as to limit the scope of the seventh amendment. Part I analyzes the debate over statutory copyright damages, concluding that historical and statutory construction arguments require these damages to be construed as legal. Part II examines some of the problems that …
The Delegation Doctrine: Could The Court Give It Substance?, David Schoenbrod
The Delegation Doctrine: Could The Court Give It Substance?, David Schoenbrod
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this Article demonstrates the need for a new approach to the delegation doctrine. It shows that the Court has failed to articulate a coherent test of improper delegation and that the alternative tests offered by commentators are not sufficient. Part II then sets forth a proposed test of improper delegation. The basic principles of an approach prohibiting delegations of legislative power are outlined and illustrated. This Article does not, however, attempt anything so grand as to suggest a final definition of the doctrine or to pass broadly on the validity of statutes. Such an encompassing analysis is …
The Twentieth-Century Primacy Of Statutory Law, Albert Tate Jr.
The Twentieth-Century Primacy Of Statutory Law, Albert Tate Jr.
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Dealing with Statutes by James Williard Hurst
Civil Procedure - Jurisdiction - Service Of Process On Foreign Television Corporation, Arnold Henson S.Ed.
Civil Procedure - Jurisdiction - Service Of Process On Foreign Television Corporation, Arnold Henson S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Defendant, a West Virginia corporation, operated a television station in Huntington, West Virginia. Its telecasts regularly reached into Boyd County, Kentucky, where part of its customary viewing audience was located. During a twelve-month period in 1954-1955 the corporation derived $71,310.30 in advertising revenue from Kentucky firms, although the contracts for this advertising were made outside Kentucky. In the course of a newscast defendant published an alleged libel against plaintiff, and suit was brought in Boyd County Court. Substituted service of process was made on the Secretary of State in accordance with the Kentucky "doing business" statute, and defendant then removed …