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Articles 1 - 26 of 26
Full-Text Articles in Law
Under School Colors: Private University Police As State Actors Under § 1983, Leigh J. Jahnig
Under School Colors: Private University Police As State Actors Under § 1983, Leigh J. Jahnig
Northwestern University Law Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may sue those who violate their constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. The Supreme Court has held that private actors may act under color of state law, and may be sued under § 1983 in some circumstances. However, courts have not been consistent in determining whether private university police forces act under color of state law. Private universities often maintain police forces that are given extensive police powers by state statutes but are controlled by private entities. Some courts have looked directly to the state statutes that delegate police power, but …
Choice Of Counsel And The Appearance Of Equal Justice Under Law, Wesley M. Oliver
Choice Of Counsel And The Appearance Of Equal Justice Under Law, Wesley M. Oliver
Northwestern University Law Review
Once a federal prosecutor obtains an indictment that seeks a forfeiture, a judge must permit the prosecutor to freeze all the potentially forfeitable assets that would be unavailable at the time of conviction. Obviously, funds used for the defense would fit into that category. Equally obvious is the tension between the government’s interest in assets that may be forfeitable and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel. A number of lower courts therefore had permitted defendants to seek release of the assets needed for a defense by challenging the grand jury’s determination that probable cause existed to believe …
Forced Decryption As Equilibrium—Why It’S Constitutional And How Riley Matters, Dan Terzian
Forced Decryption As Equilibrium—Why It’S Constitutional And How Riley Matters, Dan Terzian
Northwestern University Law Review
This Essay considers whether the government can force a person to decrypt his computer. The only courts to consider the issue limited their analyses to rote application of predigital doctrine and dicta. This is a mistake; courts should instead aim to maintain the ex ante equilibrium of privacy and government power. This approach—seeking equilibrium—was just endorsed by the Supreme Court in Riley v. California, a recent Fourth Amendment case. Yet Riley’s rationale also extends to the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, and maintaining equilibrium there requires permitting forced decryption. Because current doctrine can be interpreted as allowing forced decryption, …
In Praise Of Faction: How Special Interests Benefit Constitutional Order, Jide Nzelibe
In Praise Of Faction: How Special Interests Benefit Constitutional Order, Jide Nzelibe
Northwestern University Law Review
Political factions are rarely treated as normatively desirable entities in constitutional or international law. On the contrary, they are either regarded as forces that thwart the general welfare or as sources of chronic political instability. Thus, the conventional wisdom often focuses on how to deploy institutional or legal structures that minimize the influence of faction. By contrast, this Essay argues that the institutions of constitutional and international law that are forged by self-interested factions can create significant side benefits for the rest of the society. At bottom, such institutions are likely to be more durable and energetic than those created …
The Politics Of The Takings Clauses, Mila Versteeg
The Politics Of The Takings Clauses, Mila Versteeg
Northwestern University Law Review
A long-standing consensus exists that the arbitrary or excessive expropriation of private property by a country hurts its economic growth. Although constitutions can play an important role in protecting private property, remarkably little is known about how they actually restrict the power of eminent domain and whether such restrictions are associated with reduced de facto expropriation risks. This Essay fills that gap by presenting original data on the procedural and substantive protections in constitutional takings clauses from 1946 to 2013. Its main finding is that no observable relationship exists between de jure constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain …
Does Institutional Design Make A Difference?, Steven G. Calabresi
Does Institutional Design Make A Difference?, Steven G. Calabresi
Northwestern University Law Review
This Essay argues that there are two unappreciated aspects of U.S. constitutional design that have contributed to our country’s success. The first is the fact that the United States is divided into fifty rather than four states. This greatly strengthens the national government and renders secession almost impossible. The second is the formidable set of checks and balances set up on presidential power that makes it impossible for U.S. presidents to become dictators. The fact that thirty-nine of the fifty state governors are elected in off-year or midterm elections, elections in which the incumbent president’s party almost always loses ground …
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule
Northwestern University Law Review
I will argue that in the administrative state, in contrast to classical constitutional theory, the abuse of government power is not something to be strictly minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.
There are three principal grounds for this claim. First, the architects of the modern administrative state were not only worried about misrule by governmental officials. They were equally worried about “private” misrule—misrule effected through the self-interested or self-serving behavior of economic actors wielding and abusing …
Creating A Self-Stabilizing Constitution: The Role Of The Takings Clause, Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal, Barry R. Weingast
Creating A Self-Stabilizing Constitution: The Role Of The Takings Clause, Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal, Barry R. Weingast
Northwestern University Law Review
The U.S. Constitution has survived for over two centuries, despite the Civil War and numerous other crises. In contrast, most national constitutions last less than two decades. Why has the Constitution sustained a largely stable democratic system while so many others have failed? A self-stabilizing constitution creates incentives for all relevant actors to abide by the rules. Drawing on earlier work, we argue that, to be self- stabilizing, a constitution must (1) lower stakes in politics for both ordinary citizens and powerful elite groups; (2) create focal points that facilitate citizen coordination against transgressions by government officials; and (3) enable …
The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” And The Elections Clause, Michael T. Morley
The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” And The Elections Clause, Michael T. Morley
Northwestern University Law Review
Many states have delegated substantial authority to regulate federal elections to entities other than their institutional legislatures, such as independent redistricting commissions empowered to determine the boundaries of congressional districts. Article I’s Elections Clause and Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause, however, confer authority to regulate federal elections specifically upon State “legislatures,” rather than granting it to States as a whole. An intratextual analysis of the Constitution reveals that the term “legislature” is best understood as referring solely to the entity within each state comprised of representatives that has the general authority to pass laws. Thus, state constitutional provisions or laws …
Cases, Controversies, And Diversity, F. Andrew Hessick
Cases, Controversies, And Diversity, F. Andrew Hessick
Northwestern University Law Review
Article III’s diversity jurisdiction provisions extend the federal judicial power to state law controversies between different states or nations and their respective citizens. When exercising diversity jurisdiction, the federal judiciary does not function in its usual role of protecting federal interests or ensuring the uniformity of federal law. Instead, federal courts operate as alternative state courts for resolving disputes between diverse parties. But federal courts often cannot act as alternative state courts because of Article III justiciability doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and mootness. These doctrines define when a federal court may act. But they do not apply to state …
(Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality Depends On Discrimination, Keith Cunningham-Parmeter
(Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality Depends On Discrimination, Keith Cunningham-Parmeter
Northwestern University Law Review
Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence describe the Court’s firm opposition to sex discrimination. But while the Court famously invalidated several sex-based laws at the end of the twentieth century, it also issued many other, less-celebrated decisions that sanctioned sex-specific classifications in some circumstances. Examining these long-ignored cases that approved of sex discrimination, this Article explains how the Court’s rulings in this area have often rejected the principle of formal equality in favor of broader antisubordination concerns. Outlining a new model of equal protection that authorizes certain forms of sex discrimination, (Un)Equal Protection advocates for one particular …
Rethinking The Order Of Battle In Constitutional Torts: A Reply To John Jeffries, Nancy Leong
Rethinking The Order Of Battle In Constitutional Torts: A Reply To John Jeffries, Nancy Leong
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Demise Of "Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings", Howard M. Wasserman
The Demise Of "Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings", Howard M. Wasserman
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Foucauldian Call For The Archaeological Excavation Of Discourse In The Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation, Jonathan David Shaub
A Foucauldian Call For The Archaeological Excavation Of Discourse In The Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation, Jonathan David Shaub
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Party Polarization And Congressional Committee Consideration Of Constitutional Questions, Neal Devins
Party Polarization And Congressional Committee Consideration Of Constitutional Questions, Neal Devins
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Continuing The Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion On Justice Stevens's Establishment Clause And Free Exercise Jurisprudence, Alan Brownstein
Continuing The Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion On Justice Stevens's Establishment Clause And Free Exercise Jurisprudence, Alan Brownstein
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Fixture On A Changing Court: Justice Stevens And The Establishment Clause, Erwin Chemerinsky
A Fixture On A Changing Court: Justice Stevens And The Establishment Clause, Erwin Chemerinsky
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Meaning Of The Seventeenth Amendment And A Century Of State Defiance, Zachary D. Clopton, Steven E. Art
The Meaning Of The Seventeenth Amendment And A Century Of State Defiance, Zachary D. Clopton, Steven E. Art
Northwestern University Law Review
Nearly a century ago, the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution worked a substantial change in American government, dictating that the people should elect their senators by popular vote. Despite its significance, there has been little written about what the Amendment means or how it works. This Article provides a comprehensive interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment based on the text of the Amendment and a variety of other sources: historical and textual antecedents, relevant Supreme Court decisions, the complete debates in Congress, and the social and political factors that led to this new constitutional provision. Among other things, this analysis …
Originalism And The Ratification Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas B. Colby
Originalism And The Ratification Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas B. Colby
Northwestern University Law Review
Originalists have traditionally based the normative case for originalism primarily on principles of popular sovereignty: the Constitution owes its legitimacy as higher law to the fact that it was ratified by the American people through a supermajoritarian process. As such, it must be interpreted according to the original meaning that it had at the time of ratification. To give it another meaning today is to allow judges to enforce a legal rule that was never actually embraced and enacted by the people. Whatever the merits of this argument in general, it faces particular hurdles when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. …
Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni
Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni
Northwestern University Law Review
The rules governing judicial review of adjudication by federal agencies are insensitive to a critical separation of powers principle. Article III jurisprudence requires different treatment of agency adjudication depending on whether the agency is adjudicating a “private right” or a “public right.” When agencies adjudicate private rights, review of the agency adjudication must be available to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis. In contrast, Article III jurisprudence does not require review to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis of agency adjudications of purely public rights. That means that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications of …
What A History Of Tax Withholding Tells Us About The Relationship Between Statutes And Constitutional Law, Anuj C. Desai
What A History Of Tax Withholding Tells Us About The Relationship Between Statutes And Constitutional Law, Anuj C. Desai
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Did The Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter Today?, Erik M. Jensen
Did The Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter Today?, Erik M. Jensen
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change In The United Kingdom, Erin F. Delaney
Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change In The United Kingdom, Erin F. Delaney
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Definite Article: The D.C. Circuit's Redefinition Of Recess Appointments, Jeff Vandam
The Definite Article: The D.C. Circuit's Redefinition Of Recess Appointments, Jeff Vandam
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Doe V. Elmbrook School District And The Importance Of Refocusing Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Julie M. Karaba
Doe V. Elmbrook School District And The Importance Of Refocusing Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Julie M. Karaba
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.