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Full-Text Articles in Law
Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, And The Fortieth Anniversary Of Government By Judiciary, Eric J. Segall
Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, And The Fortieth Anniversary Of Government By Judiciary, Eric J. Segall
Fordham Law Review Online
Part I briefly summarizes Berger’s originalist approach. Part II describes how the new Judicial Engagement originalists suggest judges should resolve constitutional cases. Part III explains why text and history do not support their judicially enforceable, libertarian political agendas. Part III does not suggest that this agenda leads to bad results, is harmful, or should not be adopted by today’s judges. But for the sake of governmental and academic transparency, judges, legal scholars, and politicians who embrace Judicial Engagement, should also accept that their theory of judicial review is not supported by either the Constitution’s text or history. Judicial Engagement can …
Historians And The New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, And Constitutional Meaning, Martin S. Flaherty
Historians And The New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, And Constitutional Meaning, Martin S. Flaherty
Fordham Law Review
Toward that end, this Foreword addresses three matters. First, it considers why the use of history in constitutional interpretation is inescapable. Next, it suggests that the Essays in this forum do not go far enough in debunking the idea of “public meaning” originalism as a serious alternative to previous approaches. Finally, the balance of this Foreword reviews the also perhaps inescapable misuses of history that constitutional interpretation invites and considers the type of misuse that public meaning originalism represents.
Historicism And Holism: Failures Of Originalist Translation, Jonathan Gienapp
Historicism And Holism: Failures Of Originalist Translation, Jonathan Gienapp
Fordham Law Review
For as long as the U.S. Constitution has existed, Americans have appealed to the history of its creation to interpret its meaning. But only since the advent of originalism—the well-known constitutional theory that requires interpreting the Constitution today in accordance with its original meaning—has historical study been so immediately implicated by constitutional interpretation. Despite potential, though, for meaningful exchange between originalists and historians, little has taken place. That originalism plays an ever-growing role in contemporary political culture only makes the lack of dialogue all the more unfortunate.
“To Assemble Together For Their Common Good”: History, Ethnography, And The Original Meanings Of The Rights Of Assembly And Speech, Saul Cornell
Fordham Law Review
The Whiskey Rebellion is not generally a major focus in constitutional histories or casebooks. Given this fact, it is hardly surprising that the 1795 case Respublica v. Montgomery seldom figures as more than a minor footnote in scholarly writing about early American constitutional development, if it receives any attention at all. The case has little precedential value for modern First Amendment doctrine and only obliquely implicates larger jurisprudential questions about the rights of assembly and freedom of expression. In strictly doctrinal terms, Montgomery is primarily about the obligation of a justice of the peace to put down a riot, not …
Outsourcing The Law: History And The Disciplinary Limits Of Constitutional Reasoning, Helen Irving
Outsourcing The Law: History And The Disciplinary Limits Of Constitutional Reasoning, Helen Irving
Fordham Law Review
Debates about the use of history in constitutional interpretation find their primary nourishment in the originalism debate. This has generated a vast amount of literature, but also narrowed the terms of the debate. Originalism is a normative commitment wrapped in a questionable methodological confidence. Regardless of the multiple forms originalism takes, originalists are confident that the meaning (in the sense of intention) that animated the framing of the Constitution can be ascertained and, indeed, that they can ascertain it. The debate has largely focused, then, on whether modern-day scholars and jurists can ascertain original historical meaning or, alternatively, whether they …
Tone Deaf To The Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, Jack Rakove
Tone Deaf To The Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, Jack Rakove
Fordham Law Review
With some apologies for a vast degree of oversimplification, let us stipulate that there are two main forms of originalism. One is known as “semantic” or “public meaning” originalism. Its leading advocates include Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, and Randy Barnett (professional friends, all). The leading premise of semantic originalism is that the meaning of the constitutional text—or, more specifically, of its individual clauses—was fixed at the moment of its adoption. Under this view, the goal of constitutional interpretation is to recover that original meaning, and the best way to do that pivots on reconstructing how an informed reader, whether a …
Originalism As Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, Saul Cornell
Originalism As Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, Saul Cornell
Res Gestae
My essay was intended as a critique of originalism from the perspective of intellectual history. I pointed out that originalism lacked a rigorous empirical method for analyzing what texts meant in the past. I suppose in some sense it is flattering that Solum has devoted much of his recent article to an attack on my earlier essay. Of course, flattery aside, it would have been more useful if Solum had stated my thesis correctly. For purposes of clarity, I have juxtaposed Solum’s description of my argument with what my essay actually said. Readers will be able to judge for themselves …
The Perpetual Anxiety Of Living Constitutionalism, Ethan J. Leib
The Perpetual Anxiety Of Living Constitutionalism, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
It certainly seems like the originalists are winning. Professor Jack Balkin--finding that he couldn't beat 'em--joined them. Living constitutionalists used to turn to Balkin as a reliable advocate; he recently wrote “we are all living constitutionalists now.” But Balkin has forsaken them. Losing such an important advocate might be a sign that what some once deemed the “ascendant” and dominant theory in constitutional interpretation is on the decline. Still, don't count living constitutionalism out of the game just yet--and don't think one can embrace Balkin's approach and a true living constitutionalism at the same time.
Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate The Interpretive Debate Between Originalists And Non-Originalists, Ethan J. Leib
Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate The Interpretive Debate Between Originalists And Non-Originalists, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
In A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, they seek to explain why supermajoritarianism furnishes a new pragmatic defense of originalism. In this Essay, I dispute each of their substantive claims. First, I argue that there is nothing newly pragmatic about their defense. Although they claim to want to make originalists and pragmatists friends, nothing about their project is likely to accomplish this matchmaking. Second, I argue that there is no reason to believe that constitutional entrenchments produced under supermajoritarian decision rules are any more desirable as a general matter than rules produced under other, more relaxed, decision rules. At the core …