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Full-Text Articles in Law

Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity And The Human Radiation Experiments (Note), Nestor M. Davidson Jan 1996

Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity And The Human Radiation Experiments (Note), Nestor M. Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this Note explains why the present system does not allow individuals to recover damages against the federal government for violations of the Constitution. It first describes the doctrine of constitutional torts and its limitations. It then discusses sovereign immunity, and explains that Congress has retained sovereign immunity for constitutional torts. It concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court's policy arguments for not creating a cause of action against the government for constitutional violations. Part II explores the Human Radiation Experiments as a case study in the remedial gaps created by the current scope of Bivens and …


Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski Jan 1996

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …


Plenary Power And Constitutional Outcasts: Federal Power, Critical Race Theory, And The Second, Ninth, And Tenth Amendments , Nicholas J. Johnson Jan 1996

Plenary Power And Constitutional Outcasts: Federal Power, Critical Race Theory, And The Second, Ninth, And Tenth Amendments , Nicholas J. Johnson

Faculty Scholarship

Rights and power in modern American constitutionalism are conceptually interdependent: "We have no way of thinking about constitutional rights independent of what powers it would be prudent or desirable for government to have." In an era where substantive boundaries on federal power seem ephemeral, this suggests that what we call rights may be primarily fair weather or illusory barriers to the exercise of power.From a majoritarian perspective, the shifting boundary between rights and powers, and the capacity of power to consume rights, may be unproblematic and even attractive. If the exercise of plenary power reflects majority will, then this exercise …


Irreducible Constitution, The 1996 Jcli Religion Symposium, Abner S. Greene Jan 1996

Irreducible Constitution, The 1996 Jcli Religion Symposium, Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

No matter how hard they try, some constitutional theorists can't avoid being, at bottom, either democratic-foundationalists ("democrats") or rights-foundationalists. In the first part of this essay, I will offer a third way, insisting that at the heart of the American constitutional order is an irreconcilable conflict between these divergent accounts, that attempts to predicate constitutionalism on either democracy or rights cannot succeed. Our constitution (a term I will use to mean our constitutional order--text plus ... ) is, at the core, coreless. It cannot be resolved to a master predicate. It cannot be reduced to democracy or to rights. It …


Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins Jan 1996

Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contribution to the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, Professor Higgins explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those choices largely unexamined. In contrast, feminist legal theory's emphasis on the importance of constraints on …