Law Commons^™

The New Constitution Of The United States: Do We Need One And How Would We Get One?, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Government in the United States has some serious problems. At the federal level, is the problem of gridlock. The United States Congress seems unable or unwilling to do anything about anything (although it must have done something to run up more than $16 trillion in debts). Forget about addressing problems such as global warming, income inequality, failing schools, economic stimulus or you name it. How bad is it, really? Has the United States become ungovernable, and is the Constitution to blame? In my view, it’s a mixed bag. Some aspects of the United States government work very well, others are …

The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In tracing the arc of originalism from the old originalism to the new, I observe a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary outlook, reflected in new originalists’ proclamations that “we are all originalists now.” As my title suggests, I am going to bring out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications. The new originalists have emphasized two developments: (1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the framers” to “original public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and construction. My main points are two. First, the inclusiveness …

The Fiduciary Foundations Of Federal Equal Protection, Gary S. Lawson, Guy Seidman, Robert Natelson

Faculty Scholarship

In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court invalidated school segregation in the District of Columbia by inferring a broad “federal equal protection” principle from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is often assumed that this principle is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and with “originalist” interpretation.

This Article demonstrates, however, that a federal equal protection principle is not only consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, but inherent in it. The Constitution was crafted as a fiduciary document of the kind that, under contemporaneous law, imposed on agents acting for more than one beneficiary – and on …

Ordered Liberty: Response To Michael Dorf, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

We appreciate Michael Dorf’s serious engagement with our book and his conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge that liberalism focuses on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.”1 He charges us, however, with an “errant theodicy” – with making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.”2 He also criticizes us for deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding interest in autonomy.”3 In this response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as autonomy and to reject the …

Against Agnosticism: Why The Liberal State Isn't Just One (Authority) Among The Many, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article takes up the gauntlet thrown down by Professor Abner Greene’s recent book, Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy, to those scholars, politicians, and activists who believe that realizing the ideal of e pluribus unum (out of many, one) as well as constitutional principles of liberty and equality require a robust role for government. Government, Greene argues, is just one source of authority among many others, and citizens – or even public officials – have no general moral duty to obey the law. The political and constitutional order of the United States, he contends, …

Originalism Without Obligation, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

I am truly delighted that Boston University School of Law is hosting a conference on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation1 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience. 2 Both books launch powerful and much-needed broadsides against the idea of a political obligation to obey the U.S. Constitution, and more generally (whether or not the authors embrace these implications) against the very idea of a political obligation to obey state authorities. I fully agree with both authors that the arguments normally made in favor of a duty of obedience to the Constitution, and by extension to state authorities of any kind, are remarkably …

Critical Reflections On Seidman's On Constitutional Disobedience, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium contribution critically examines Louis Seidman’s book "Constitutional Disobedience" (2012). Seidman questions whether American constitutionalism really has the positive values commonly attributed to it. He suggests that citizens and legislators should shift away from claims that the Constitution requires or forbids certain governmental choices and toward more straightforward, “all-things-considered” political debate about “how to solve real, modern problems” and “about what will produce the best country.” I argue against Seidman's view that straightforward political talk will be less polarizing and divisive than constitution-invoking discussion. Seidman, I think, might romanticize ordinary political discussion in somewhat the same way that orthodox …

Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an essay on one or both books.

Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My response is: “I hope not!” In the Article, I explain why. But first, I show that there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question “Are we all originalists now?” suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call “the originalist premise.” To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that …

The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.' Both works pair two spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate between two competing views prevalent in their fields. Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.

Ordered Liberty: Response To Michael Dorf, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

We appreciate Michael Dorf's serious engagement with our book and his conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge that liberalism focuses on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.” 1 He charges us, however, with an “errant theodicy” - with making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.” 2 He also criticizes us for deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding interest in autonomy.” 3 In this response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as autonomy and …

Night Of The Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate And The Zombie Constitution, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

If someone had told me on June 27, 2012, that five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were about to hold in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 1 (NFIB) that the individual mandate provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2 (PPACA) was not constitutionally authorized either by the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, 3 I would have popped a cork. I don't even drink, but I would have popped the cork on principle just to hear the sound (and also to irritate my colleagues, most of whom revere the PPACA the way …

Young Again, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

This essay revisits an old problem in the law of federal courts: the source of the right of action in Ex parte Young. The core of the story underlying Young is familiar. Shareholders in railroad corporations filed suit in a federal circuit court, claiming that state established rail rates in Minnesota violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the (dormant) Commerce Clause. The circuit court issued a preliminary injunction barring adoption of the rates and prohibiting the defendants from attempting to enforce them. One of the defendants, Minnesota Attorney General Edward T. Young, nonetheless brought a state court mandamus action against the …