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Full-Text Articles in Law

Tying And Bundled Discounts: An Equilibrium Analysis Of Antitrust Liability Tests, Melanie S. Williams Sep 2015

Tying And Bundled Discounts: An Equilibrium Analysis Of Antitrust Liability Tests, Melanie S. Williams

Melanie S. Williams

Courts have struggled with determining when bundled discounts constitute unlawfully anticompetitive behavior. The current circuit split reflects an absence of consensus. This lack of legal guidance creates uncertainty in the market, with firms being given inconsistent – and sometimes contradictory - standards on how to avoid antitrust liability.

For the most part, we consider a standard paradigm for analyzing bundled discounts. Suppose that there are two firms. Firm 1 produces a monopoly product, A, and also another product, B, which competes with another version of B produced by Firm 2. The concern is the extent to which the price paid …


Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding For Startups Across The Private Equity Gap, Seth C. Oranburg Feb 2015

Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding For Startups Across The Private Equity Gap, Seth C. Oranburg

Seth C Oranburg

Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012, which attempts to encourage entrepreneurship by allowing startups and small business to sell stock to the general public over the Internet through “crowdfunding,” is completely backwards. Its ceiling should be a floor—the $1 million limit should be inverted. By capping startups at raising $1 million from crowdfunding, the JOBS Act does not address the private equity gap, a fundamental problem in startup markets, and exposes unsophisticated investors to risk and fraud. This Article presents a regulatory framework premised on “bridgefunding,” an approach that this article develops to protect new investors by encouraging …


Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal Aug 2014

Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal

Yugank Goyal

Developing countries suffer from underperforming regulatory agencies compared to those in the developed world. The paper attempts to theorize general reasons behind such divergence. It argues that the differences lie in developing countries’ (a) higher priorities for redistribution, (b) structurally different institutional endowments, especially at informal level, and (c) limited informational channels. The paper proposes that a multi-stakeholder (with increased emphasis on judiciary and civil society) approach has potential to address the shortcomings. It tests these claims through studying cases of telecom and electricity regulation in India.