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Full-Text Articles in Law

Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win Jun 2021

Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win

Golden Gate University Law Review

The rapid development of the digital marketplace led the United States Supreme Court to revisit the forty-two year old antitrust precedent set in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court decided that under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, direct purchasers have standing to sue for treble damages due to unfair business practices, while indirect purchasers do not. Over four decades later, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court reevaluated this doctrine. This time, the Court had to determine which party received the “direct purchaser” status in a situation where plaintiffs bought apps from …


Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2019

Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Indiana Law Journal

Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. In many of these cases the threat is that in concentrated markets—those with only a few sellers—the merger increases the likelihood of collusion or collusion-like behavior. The result will be that the post-merger firm will reduce the volume of sales in the affected market and prices will rise.

Mergers can also injure competition in markets in which the firms purchase, however. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases …


Mixed Agendas And Government Regulation Of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, Thomas M. Arnold, Jerry L. Stevens May 2011

Mixed Agendas And Government Regulation Of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, Thomas M. Arnold, Jerry L. Stevens

University of Richmond Law Review

The purpose of this article is first to navigate through variousperspectives on government regulation in an effort to develop areasonable and consistent view for regulatory proposals. Parts II and III of this article provide a brief outline of our current regulatory environment and its evolution. Part IV presents arguments for an efficient regulation of business by using market based regulation with a separation of efficiency and equity issues, where feasible. Examples of this regulatory approach appear throughout the article along with suggested reforms.


Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal Takeovers And Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 Of The Clayton Act After Cargill, Brent W. Huber Apr 1991

Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal Takeovers And Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 Of The Clayton Act After Cargill, Brent W. Huber

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Bribery And Brokerage: An Analysis Of Bribery In Domestic And Foreign Commerce Under Section 2 ( C ) Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review Aug 1978

Bribery And Brokerage: An Analysis Of Bribery In Domestic And Foreign Commerce Under Section 2 ( C ) Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note first analyzes the substantive and jurisdictional criteria of section 2(c) to evaluate the possible and the desirable scope of its applicability to commercial bribery. The Note next asks whether this statute reaches bribery of domestic and foreign government officials and concludes that where the requirements of section 2(c) are otherwise met and where the person accepting the bribe is acting administratively rather than politically, the statute could be applied to bribery of agents of domestic governments. However, a wholesale application of section 2( c) to bribery of foreign government agents would leave American competitors in foreign commerce defenseless …


Pfizer, Inc. V. Government Of India: The Ability Of Foreign Governments To Sue Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, Jannet L. Gurian Jan 1978

Pfizer, Inc. V. Government Of India: The Ability Of Foreign Governments To Sue Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, Jannet L. Gurian

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce

This Note will show that the Court's opinion should be liberally construed, thereby granting foreign governments the right to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act whenever they are injured by American anticompetitive practices.


The Legal Status Of Joint Ventures Under The Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, Joseph F. Brodley Jan 1976

The Legal Status Of Joint Ventures Under The Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Enforcement Of The Merger Laws By Private Party Litigation, Earl W. Kintner, Merle F. Wilberding Jan 1972

Enforcement Of The Merger Laws By Private Party Litigation, Earl W. Kintner, Merle F. Wilberding

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


In Aggravation Of Merger, G. E. Hale, Rosemary D. Hale Jan 1968

In Aggravation Of Merger, G. E. Hale, Rosemary D. Hale

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, Milton Handler Nov 1964

Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, Milton Handler

Michigan Law Review

Ever since the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts have consistently refused to permit the requirements of antitrust to be circumvented by the easy expedient of dressing a sale in the vestments of a sham agency agreement. In Dr. Miles Medical, where the Supreme Court first held vertical price fixing unlawful, the seller and buyer denominated their agreement as an "agency," but the Court properly concluded that it was, in fact, a sale. Likewise, in Standard-Magrane, the first occasion on which the Court considered section of the Clayton Act, the seller purported to appoint his customers as …


Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity Of The Product" Defense, F. Bruce Kulp Jr. Jun 1964

Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity Of The Product" Defense, F. Bruce Kulp Jr.

Michigan Law Review

One of the most frequently asserted defenses to an action under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act against a tying arrangement-a contractual limitation imposed by a manufacturer whereby the purchaser of the "tying product" agrees to purchase a related "tied product" only from the manufacturer of the tying product-has been that the tying was necessary to protect the good will or the integrity of the tying product. Whether the tied product is service for the tying product, another component in a system in which the tying product is used, repair parts for the tying product, or any other …


Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination In The Marketing Of Gasoline, Howard R. Lurie S.Ed. Mar 1963

Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination In The Marketing Of Gasoline, Howard R. Lurie S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The emergence of chain stores and mail-order houses in the 1920's posed a new threat to competition; this time at the retail level. The quantity purchase discounts which large buyers could exact placed the small independent merchant at a competitive disadvantage so substantial as to cast doubt upon his continued presence in the competitive picture. To prevent these competitive advantages, which were felt to be unfair and undesirable, Congress, in 1936, passed the Robinson-Patman Act which, in part, amended section 2 of the Clayton Act. The effect of the amendment was to tighten the application of the quantity purchase defense …


A Decade Of The Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Charles J. Steele Oct 1961

A Decade Of The Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Charles J. Steele

Vanderbilt Law Review

Corporations intent upon expanding via the acquisition route have had three statutory hurdles placed in their way by the Congress of the United States. As hurdles, the first two, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, were failures. A judiciary which refused to give effect either to the language or intent of the acts nullified completely their usefulness as anti-merger weapons.

The third hurdle, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, was enacted in 1950. Relatively few judicial opinions have interpreted this act, "new section 7," as it is called. It is clear, however, that it …


Affirmative Benefits Of Industrial Mergers And Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, Richard A. Givens Oct 1960

Affirmative Benefits Of Industrial Mergers And Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, Richard A. Givens

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Industrial Marketing Through Leasing Devices: A Survey Of Antitrust Problems Jan 1960

Industrial Marketing Through Leasing Devices: A Survey Of Antitrust Problems

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Antitrust Considerations In Motor Carrier Mergers, Carl H. Fulda Jun 1958

Antitrust Considerations In Motor Carrier Mergers, Carl H. Fulda

Michigan Law Review

Unification of separate independent business enterprises in a single organization may raise important questions of antitrust policy. The entity which emerges may have acquired, as a result of such unification, a market position of such significance that a substantial lessening of competition or even the creation of a monopoly becomes not only possible but probable. This would be apparent whenever opportunities for buyers of the products or services of the new single unit to shop freely, and to make independent decisions as to prices, channels of purchases and selection of suppliers were to be seriously curtailed, or where such curtailment …


Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise Jun 1955

Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise

Michigan Law Review

The American genius lies quite as much in distribution as in manufacturing. Other peoples have demonstrated equal or greater creative ability in many fields. And it is debatable whether their talents are any less at mass production given adequate economic demand. But they have nowhere shown the American genius for distribution. It is axiomatic that if you manufacture in Detroit and your potential customer lives in New York, you need mutual friends. We seem to have figured out better ways to provide better friends for this purpose than any other nation.

But manufacturing came first. Someone had to build a …


Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed. Feb 1954

Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The purposes of this comment are to analyze the holding of the Court in the Automatic Canteen case and to relate the language of the opinion to the more general problem of defining the extent of buyer responsibility under section 2(f). As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for buyers in interstate commerce" ... knowingly to induce or receive a · discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." In other words, it prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving the benefit of …


Price Discriminations And Their Justifications Under The Robinson-Patman Act Of 1936, John T. Haslett Feb 1948

Price Discriminations And Their Justifications Under The Robinson-Patman Act Of 1936, John T. Haslett

Michigan Law Review

The Robinson-Patman Act was approved by the President on June 19, 1936. The purpose of the act was to amend section 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited price discriminations in interstate commerce. Congress, by amending section 2 of the Clayton Act, broadened the scope of the section by extending its purposes and prohibitions to price discriminations not formerly covered and by prohibiting other forms of discrimination which give favored purchasers undue cost advantages over their non-favored competitors. It also reduced the extent of requisite competitive injury.


Interstate Commerce-Freight-Rate Discrimination-Action By The Interstate Commerce Commission And The Supreme Court, John F. Buchman, Iii Feb 1948

Interstate Commerce-Freight-Rate Discrimination-Action By The Interstate Commerce Commission And The Supreme Court, John F. Buchman, Iii

Michigan Law Review

The attack upon alleged discrimination against industrial development of the South, Southwest, and West by the maintenance of higher freight-rates on shipments from those sections to the greater markets of the North and East has followed two plans: (1) complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission to remedy the discrimination by the exercise of its power over the rates themselves; (2) anti-trust action against the agencies through which the rates are initiated. The second plan of attack is illustrated by prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice Anti-Trust Division against forty-seven western railroads for illegal conspiracy to set unfair freight-rates, and …


Recent Important Decisions, Michigan Law Review Jun 1922

Recent Important Decisions, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

No abstract provided.


Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates Jan 1916

Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates

Articles

The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Parks & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 58 L. Ed. 1041, which held invalid contracts, whether nominally of agency, or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer. But there are more …