Law Commons^™

Business Information And Nondisclosure Agreements: A Public Policy Framework, Rex N. Alley

Northwestern University Law Review

Trade secret law, as codified in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, gives businesses in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction a uniform, clearly defined right to protect secret and valuable business information from misappropriation. But how can businesses protect information that, while potentially useful, falls short of the legal definition of a trade secret? Businesses often require their employees to sign nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) to protect this category of information, which this Note refers to as “confidential business information” or “CBI.” These CBI NDAs are often drafted so broadly that, read literally, they would encompass every piece of information an employee learns …

Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. Behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes that the large share of wrongdoing is generated by “good people” whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from “bounded ethicality”—various cognitive and motivational limitations in their ethical decision-making processes—that leads to biased decisions that seem legitimate. Bounded ethicality has important implications for a …

Delaware's New Competition, William J. Moon

Northwestern University Law Review

According to the standard account in American corporate law, states compete to supply corporate law to American corporations, with Delaware dominating the market. This “competition” metaphor in turn informs some of the most important policy debates in American corporate law.

This Article complicates the standard account, introducing foreign nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the increasingly globalized market for corporate law. In recent decades, entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands have used permissive corporate governance rules and specialized business courts to attract publicly traded American corporations. Aided in part by a select group of private sector …

Traceable Shares And Corporate Law, George S. Geis

Northwestern University Law Review

A healthy system of shareholder voting is crucial for any regime of corporate law. The proper allocation of governance power is subject to debate, of course, but the fitness of the underlying mechanism used to stuff the ballot boxes should concern everyone. Proponents of shareholder power, for instance, cannot argue for greater control if the legitimacy of the resulting tallies is suspect. And those who advocate for board deference do so on the bedrock of authority that reliable shareholder elections supposedly confer.

Unfortunately, our trust in the corporate franchise was forged during an era that predates modern complexities in the …

Commitment And Entrenchment In Corporate Governance, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale, Simone M. Sepe

Northwestern University Law Review

Over the past twenty years, a growing number of empirical studies have provided evidence that governance arrangements protecting incumbents from removal promote managerial entrenchment, reducing firm value. As a result of these studies, “good” corporate governance is widely understood today as being about stronger shareholder rights.

This Article rebuts this view, presenting new empirical evidence that challenges the results of prior studies and developing a novel theoretical account of what really matters in corporate governance. Employing a unique dataset that spans from 1978 to 2008, we document that protective arrangements that require shareholder approval—such as staggered boards and supermajority requirements …

Shareholders On Shaky Ground: Section 271'S Remaining Loophole, Alex Righi

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.