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Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Corporate Law For Good People, Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Northwestern University Law Review
This Article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. Behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes that the large share of wrongdoing is generated by “good people” whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from “bounded ethicality”—various cognitive and motivational limitations in their ethical decision-making processes—that leads to biased decisions that seem legitimate. Bounded ethicality has important implications for a …
Delaware's New Competition, William J. Moon
Delaware's New Competition, William J. Moon
Northwestern University Law Review
According to the standard account in American corporate law, states compete to supply corporate law to American corporations, with Delaware dominating the market. This “competition” metaphor in turn informs some of the most important policy debates in American corporate law.
This Article complicates the standard account, introducing foreign nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the increasingly globalized market for corporate law. In recent decades, entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands have used permissive corporate governance rules and specialized business courts to attract publicly traded American corporations. Aided in part by a select group of private sector …
Traceable Shares And Corporate Law, George S. Geis
Traceable Shares And Corporate Law, George S. Geis
Northwestern University Law Review
A healthy system of shareholder voting is crucial for any regime of corporate law. The proper allocation of governance power is subject to debate, of course, but the fitness of the underlying mechanism used to stuff the ballot boxes should concern everyone. Proponents of shareholder power, for instance, cannot argue for greater control if the legitimacy of the resulting tallies is suspect. And those who advocate for board deference do so on the bedrock of authority that reliable shareholder elections supposedly confer.
Unfortunately, our trust in the corporate franchise was forged during an era that predates modern complexities in the …