Law Commons^™

Appealing Compelled Disclosures In Discovery That Threaten First Amendment Rights, Richard L. Heppner Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

Last year, the Supreme Court held in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta that a California anti-fraud policy compelling charities to disclose the identities of their major donors violated the First Amendment. That holding stems from the 1958 case NAACP v. Alabama where the Court held that a discovery order compelling the NAACP to disclose the names of its members violated the First Amendment right of free association because of the members’ justifiable fear of retaliation.

In the over sixty years since NAACP v. Alabama, the Court has only decided a handful of cases about how compelled disclosures of …

The Shifting Sands Of Cost Shifting, Andrew M. Pardieck

Cleveland State Law Review

The cost-shifting analysis employed by the federal courts in ruling on discovery disputes is flawed. There is tremendous variability in how courts interpret the factors guiding the analysis. There is tremendous variability in the information courts rely on in deciding whether to preclude the discovery or shift its costs. The result is waste for the litigants, courts, and society as a whole. This Article argues that there is a better way: mandate cooperation before cost shifting. The courts should condition proportionality and cost-shifting rulings on cooperation. The cooperation should be substantive: require disclosure of objective information about the disputed discovery …

Discovering Racial Discrimination By The Police, Alison Siegler, William Admussen

Northwestern University Law Review

For decades, it was virtually impossible for a criminal defendant to challenge racial discrimination by the police or prosecutors. This was because in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme Court set an insurmountable standard for obtaining discovery in support of a selective prosecution claim. Equating the roles of prosecutors and law enforcement officers, lower courts applied this same standard to claims alleging racial discrimination by the police. This high standard led courts to deny discovery and stifle potentially meritorious claims. Recently, criminal defendants have initiated a wave of challenges to “fake stash house” operations, in which …

Trending @ Rwu Law: Dean Yelnosky's Post: Chelsea Manning, Professor David Coombs, And The "Wikileaks Trial" 08-28-2017, Edward Fitzpatrick, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

A Diamond In The Rough: Trans-Substantivity Of The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure And Its Detrimental Impact On Civil Rights, Suzette Malveaux

Publications

No abstract provided.

Twombly And Iqbal: The Introduction Of A Heightened Pleading Standard, Shira A. Sheindlin Honorable

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

I Could Have Been A Contender: Summary Jury Trial As A Means To Overcome Iqbal's Negative Effects Upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation And Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, Nancy A. Welsh

Journal Articles

With its recent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the Supreme Court may be intentionally or unintentionally “throwing the fight,” at least in the legal contests between many civil rights claimants and institutional defendants. The most obvious feared effect is reduction of civil rights claimants’ access to the expressive and coercive power of the courts. Less obviously, the Supreme Court may be effectively undermining institutions’ motivation to negotiate, mediate - or even communicate with and listen to - such claimants before they initiate legal action. Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have the potential to deprive …

Front Loading And Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address The Detrimental Effect Of Iqbal On Civil Rights Cases, Suzette M. Malveaux

Publications

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are trans-substantive, they have a greater detrimental effect on certain substantive claims. In particular, the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading requirement and Rule 12(b)(6)’s dismissal criteria - in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal - sets forth a plausibility pleading standard which makes it more difficult for potentially meritorious civil rights claims alleging intentional discrimination to survive dismissal. Such claims are more vulnerable to dismissal because: plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination often plead facts consistent with both legal and illegal conduct; discriminatory intent is often difficult, if not impossible, …

Lilly Ledbetter, Take Two: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Of 2009 And The Discovery Rule's Place In The Pay Discrimination Puzzle, Nancy Zisk

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

No abstract provided.

The Failure Of Title Vii As A Rights-Claiming System, Deborah Brake, Joanna L. Grossman

Articles

This Article takes a comprehensive look at the failure of Title VII as a system for claiming nondiscrimination rights. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), requiring an employee to assert a Title VII pay discrimination claim within 180 days of when the discriminatory pay decision was first made, marks the tip of the iceberg in this flawed system. In the past decade, Title VII doctrines at both ends of the rights-claiming process have become increasing hostile to employees. At the front end, Title VII imposes strict requirements on …

Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion Of After-Acquired Evidence In Title Vii Litigation, Ann C. Mcginley

Scholarly Works

This Article analyzes the use of after-acquired evidence to defeat a discrimination victim's claim against her employer. The use of the Mount Healthy and Price Waterhouse mixed motives analysis in after-acquired evidence cases is misplaced because it is impossible for the permissible motive—resume fraud—to have been a factor in the adverse employment decision. Furthermore, after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it would be an improper judicial intrusion upon the power of the legislature for courts to apply mixed motives analysis to these cases. Besides the constitutional limitation on the judiciary's power created by the Civil Rights …

Sanctions, Symmetry, And Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication Of Rule 11 By Harmonizing It With Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

With only a small risk of overstatement, one could say that sanctions in civil litigation exploded during the 1980s, with the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 acting as the principal catalyst. From 1938 until the 1983 amendment, only two dozen or so cases on Rule 11 were reported, with courts rarely imposing sanctions. Although a few cases were notable by virtue of sanction size, prestige of the firm sanctioned, or publicity attending the underlying case, the legal profession largely regarded Rule 11 as a dead letter. In addition, other sanctions provisions, such as Federal Rule of …

A Plea For Help: Pleading Problems In Section 1983 Municipal Liability Claims, Evan S. Schwartz

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege And Discovery Of Affirmative Action Plans In Title Vii Suits, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that plaintiffs should have access to affirmative action plans in discovery. Part I describes the "self-critical analysis" or "self-evaluative" privilege that employers have advanced to block discovery of such plans. Part II examines the conflicting interests of society, employers and employees in allowing or denying discovery. Part III evaluates the application of a self-critical analysis privilege in light of these conflicting interests and concludes that the privilege should not be applied to affirmative action plans.

Civil Rights By Default, Barbara Kaye Besser, Charles Guerrier

Cleveland State Law Review

It is the intention of this article to discuss the existing devices available to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to compel a respondent to provide the relevant factual information requested; to point out the inadequacies of these procedures; and to propose an additional method to effectuate a speedy resolution of the controversies before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.