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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Civil Rights Act Of 1964 And 'Legislating Morality': On Conscience, Prejudice, And Whether 'Stateways' Can Change 'Folkways', Linda C. Mcclain
The Civil Rights Act Of 1964 And 'Legislating Morality': On Conscience, Prejudice, And Whether 'Stateways' Can Change 'Folkways', Linda C. Mcclain
Faculty Scholarship
Influential studies, from the 1940s and 1950s, of the problem of prejudice and how to remedy it challenged the famous assertion of nineteenth-century sociologist William Graham Sumner that “stateways don’t change folkways,” and its modern counterparts, “you cannot legislate against prejudice” or “you cannot legislate morality.” Social scientists countered that, although people might initially protest, they would welcome a federal antidiscrimination law that aligned with conscience and closed the gap between American ideals and prejudice, creating new “folkways.” Using examples from the contexts of public accommodations, education, and employment, this Article examines similar arguments made about conscience and “legislating morality” …
Federalism, Marriage, And Heather Gerken's Mad Genius, Kristin Collins
Federalism, Marriage, And Heather Gerken's Mad Genius, Kristin Collins
Faculty Scholarship
In her characteristically astute and engaging essay, Professor Heather Gerken offers a sensitive and sympathetic reading of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. Windsor.1 Her core claim is that Windsor—and the transformation of political and legal support for same-sex marriage in the United States—demonstrate how “federalism and rights work together to promote change” and, in particular, how federalism furthers the equality and liberty values of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This is a natural line of argument for Gerken to develop with respect to Windsor, as she has produced an incredible body of scholarship dedicated to what …
Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
As the title suggests, the article examines Morrison’s creation of the rule that the Section Five power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation …