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If It (Ain’T) Broke, Don’T Fix It: Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 84, And The Forms, Justin Olson
If It (Ain’T) Broke, Don’T Fix It: Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 84, And The Forms, Justin Olson
Seattle University Law Review
The past decade has not been kind to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules). From the growth of summary judgment as a mechanism to let judges instead of juries determine facts, to the love–hate relationship with class actions, judicial interpretations of the Rules have revealed a trend toward complicating the ability of plaintiffs to find redress for their claims. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the shifting standards of pleading requirements under Rule 8. Much has been written by academics and practitioners alike regarding the ripples caused by Twombly and Iqbal. Although the Court would like to …
A Barrier To Child Welfare Reform: The Supreme Court’S Flexible Approach To Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(B)(5) And Granting Relief To States In Institutional Reform Litigation, Rachel Dunnington
Seattle University Law Review
In a recent decision, Horne v. Flores, the Court demanded a broader and more flexible application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 60(b)(5). In doing so, the Court opened the door for states to seek relief from court-enforced agreements like consent decrees. This decision undermines the use of institutional reform litigation as a means of fixing the child welfare system and thus deals a further blow to the nation’s most vulnerable citizens. This Note will discuss Horne’s impact on consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation in child welfare. Part II will explore the history of Rule 60 as …
Pro Se Litigants: Application Of A Single Objective Standard Under Frcp 11 To Reduce Frivolous Litigation, Brian L. Holtzclaw
Pro Se Litigants: Application Of A Single Objective Standard Under Frcp 11 To Reduce Frivolous Litigation, Brian L. Holtzclaw
Seattle University Law Review
This Comment addresses the application of Rule 11 sanctions to pro se litigants and argues that based on the language of Rule 11, the concerns expressed in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11, and the primary goal of Rule 11 to deter abusive pleadings, a single objective standard should be applied to all parties-attorneys, represented parties, and pro se litigants-to determine whether Rule 11 has been violated. Under this single objective standard, a pro se litigant's lack of legal representation should be considered only in determining the severity of the sanction, not in determining whether Rule 11 has been …