Law Commons^™

The Repressible Myth Of Shady Grove, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article untangles the effects of the Supreme Court's latest word on the Erie doctrine, by taking the vantage point of a lower court trying to uncover the logical implications of the Court's new pronouncement. First, Shady Grove lightly confirms the limited role of constitutional constraints. Second, it sheds only a little light on judicial choice-of-law methodology. Third, by contrast, it does considerably clarify the conflict between Federal Rules and state law: if a Rule regulates procedure, then it is valid and applicable without exception in all federal cases, to the extent of its coverage; in determining the Rule's coverage, …

When Can Attorneys' Fees Be Recovered In An Award Enforcement Action, M. Anderson Berry, Katherine S. Ritchey, Nandini Iyer

M. Anderson Berry

Because parties do not always comply with arbitration awards, it may be necessary for the prevailing party to seek enforcement of the award in a court of law—typically in a jurisdiction where the losing party has sufficient assets. This article focuses on whether the prevailing party can recover attorneys’ fees accrued during the enforcement procedure in U.S. district court under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

In Defense Of The Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, Jennifer S. Hendricks

Publications

John Hart Ely famously observed, "We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure," but for most of Erie's history, the Supreme Court has answered the question "Does this state law govern in federal court? " with a "yes" or a "no." Beginning, however, with Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, and continuing with Semtek v. Lockheed Martin and the dissenting opinion in Shady Grove v. Allstate, a shifting coalition of justices has pursued a third path. Instead of declaring state law applicable or inapplicable, they have claimed for …

Resolving Interstate Conflicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

States have adopted several different regimes of recognition for same-sex couples. A few states allow same-sex couples to marry; several others offer marriage-like partnerships (usually called civil unions), which provide all or nearly all of the substantive rights and responsibilities associated with marriage; still others offer marriage-lite partnerships (sometimes called reciprocal benefits arrangements), which provide a small subset of the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage; and, of course, others offer no recognition at all.

What happens when these regimes of recognition collide? For example, what happens when a couple marries in Massachusetts and then moves to a marriage-like state, …