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Fee Shifting, Nominal Damages, And The Public Interest, Maureen Carroll
Fee Shifting, Nominal Damages, And The Public Interest, Maureen Carroll
Law & Economics Working Papers
As the Supreme Court recognized in its 2021 decision in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, nominal damages can redress violations of “important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights.” For some plaintiffs who establish a violation of their constitutional rights, nominal damages will be the only relief available. In its 1992 decision in Farrar v. Hobby, however, the Court disparaged the nominal-damages remedy. The case involved the interpretation of federal fee-shifting statutes, which enable prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the defendant. According to Farrar, a plaintiff can prevail by obtaining the “technical” remedy of nominal damages, but …
Bottom-Rung Appeals, Merritt E. Mcalister
Bottom-Rung Appeals, Merritt E. Mcalister
UF Law Faculty Publications
There are haves and have-nots in the federal appellate courts, and the haves get more attention. For decades the courts have used a triage regime where they distribute judicial attention selectively: some appeals receive a lot of judicial attention, some appeals receive barely any. What this work unearths is that this triage system produces demonstrably unequal results depending on the circuit handling the appeal and whether the appellant has counsel or not. Together, these two factors produce dramatic disparities: in one circuit, for example, an unrepresented appellant receives, on average, a decision less than a tenth the length of a …
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister
UF Law Faculty Publications
Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …