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Full-Text Articles in Law

Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel Jan 2022

Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.

As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …


Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop Jan 2019

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop

Faculty Scholarship

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …


Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious Case Of The Brokaw Act, Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, Jonathan Zandberg Dec 2018

Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious Case Of The Brokaw Act, Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, Jonathan Zandberg

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The Brokaw Act was proposed legislation aimed at “financial abuses being carried out by activist hedge funds who promote short-term gains at the expense of long-term growth . . . .” Sponsoring Senators named it after a small town in Wisconsin that, according to the Act’s sponsors, was decimated by the actions of a hedge fund activist in shutting down the local paper mill with a loss of hundreds of jobs. The Brokaw Act represented the first attempt at federal legislation aimed at restricting hedge fund activism. Since then, new and similar bipartisan proposals have appeared as have threats of …


The Agency Costs Of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, And The Public Morality, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2017

The Agency Costs Of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, And The Public Morality, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Few doubt that hedge fund activism has radically changed corporate governance in the United States – for better or for worse. Proponents see activists as desirable agents of change who intentionally invest in underperforming companies to organize more passive shareholders to support their proposals to change the target’s business model and/or management. So viewed, the process is fundamentally democratic, with institutional shareholders determining whether or not to support the activist’s proposals.

Skeptics respond that things do not work this simply. Actual proxy contests are few, and most activist engagements are resolved through private settlement negotiations between the activists, who rarely …