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Business Organizations Law

Corporate social responsibility

Columbia Law School

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2022

Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of regulation is that it exists to constrain corporate activity that harms the public. But amid perceptions of government failure, many now call on corporations to tackle social problems themselves. And in this moment of dissatisfaction with government, powerful asset managers have stepped in to serve as regulators of last resort, adopting rules that bind corporate America on issues of great social importance, including climate change and workplace diversity. This Article describes this dynamic — where shareholders have become regulators — which has been made possible by the rise of institutional shareholding (and index investing in particular) …


Combatting Wage Theft In Global Supply Chains: A Proposal For Transnational Wage Lien Laws, Nabila N. Khan Jan 2022

Combatting Wage Theft In Global Supply Chains: A Proposal For Transnational Wage Lien Laws, Nabila N. Khan

LL.M. Essays & Theses

When the world went into lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, major fashion brands attempted to protect their profits by refusing to pay overseas suppliers for over $16 billion USD of goods between April and June 2020. These decisions had a devastating impact on garment workers who toil at the bottom of the supply chain; thousands of garment workers and their families faced wage theft, dealing with months of unpaid wages, benefits and/or severance pay. In the absence of a regulatory framework to hold corporations responsible, workers, unions, and NGOs resorted to naming and shaming brands into taking action. However, …


Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2021

Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …


The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2021

The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the …


Preserving The Corporate Superego In A Time Of Activism: An Essay On Ethics And Economics, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2016

Preserving The Corporate Superego In A Time Of Activism: An Essay On Ethics And Economics, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This essay focuses on the impact of recent changes in corporate governance on ethical behavior within the public corporation. It argues that a style of corporate behavior – one characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits and a disregard for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies – is attributable in significant part to recent changes in corporate governance, including the rise of hedge fund activism, greater use of incentive compensation, and the appearance of blockholder directors. It then surveys feasible responses intended to strengthen the role of the boards as the corporation’s conscience and superego. Given the …