Law Commons^™

A Look Back In Time: Analyzing The Success And Value Of The 2014 Amendments To Rule 2a-7 And Reporting On Form N-Cr In Light Of The March 2020 Market Events, Jocelyn Near

Catholic University Law Review

Money market funds have frequently been a target of regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Perhaps the most expansive regulation came as a response to the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck.” The SEC’s misguided 2014 reforms exacerbated the inherent risks of money market funds, including the risk of runs and first mover advantage, particularly with the implementation of Form N-CR. Form N-CR requires a money market fund to publicly report when various events occur, including when a retail or government money market fund’s current net asset value per share deviates downward …

Learning To Do Good While Doing Well 11-2023, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Startup Biases, Jennifer S. Fan

Articles

This Article provides an original descriptive account of bias in the startup context and explains why litigation is eschewed and what happens when it is used as a mechanism to combat bias in the venture capital ecosystem. Further, this Article identifies two particular phenomena in the startup context that exacerbate gender and racial bias. First, homophily—the idea that like attracts like—abounds and has been part of the DNA of venture capital since its inception. The thick networks that developed as venture capital made its way from the East Coast to the West Coast were limited to an elite group that …

The Landscape Of Startup Corporate Governance In The Founder-Friendly Era, Jennifer S. Fan

Articles

In corporate governance scholarship, there is an important debate about the nature and roles of the members of the board of directors in venture capital-backed private companies. The impact of a newly emerged, founder-centric model has been underappreciated, while the role of the independent director as tiebreaker or swing vote is vastly overstated. The reality is that corporate governance in these companies is a norm-driven, consensus-building process that rarely spills out into open conflict.

This is the first empirical study of startup corporate governance post-Great Recession and during the pandemic. Using survey and interview methodologies, this Article makes four primary …

The Problem With Predators, June Carbone, William K. Black

Seattle University Law Review

Both corporate theory and sex discrimination law start with presumptions that CEOs seek to advance legitimate ends and design the internal organization of business enterprises to achieve such ends. Yet, a growing literature questions why CEOs and boards of directors nonetheless select for Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and toxic masculinity, despite the downsides associated with these traits. Three scholarly literatures—economics, criminology, and gender theory—draw on advances in psychology to shed new light on the construction of seemingly dysfunctional corporate cultures. They start by questioning the assumption that CEOs—even CEOs of seemingly mainstream businesses—necessarily seek to advance “legitimate” ends. Instead, they suggest …

The Role Of The Board Of Financial Services Firms In Improving Their Firm's Culture, Ciaran Walker

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, we look at the role the board is expected to play under regulatory requirements and guidance; we then look specifically at the failings of boards in a number of the recent “scandals.” Finally, we offer a number of suggestions on ways in which the board can have a more effective role in improving firms’ culture. In this latter regard, we specifically focus on industry (rather than firm-specific) initiatives that could enable the board to have a more effective role, particularly in light of the setting up of the industry-funded Banking Standards Board in the U.K. and the …

The Effects Of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, And "Privateness" On Corporate Cultures, Donald C. Langevoort

Seattle University Law Review

My conundrum question is this: suppose managerialism triumphed in the governance wars so as to regain its desired level of autonomy from shareholder pressures for boards and managers—would we then expect to see a cultural shift inside corporations toward greater honesty and civil engagement, and if so, why? A helpful diagnostic question is to ask how managers currently construe shareholder and market primacy. Have they internalized it as a value or do they instead resent the demands? My argument here leans more toward resentment, though my contribution is more about how to develop a credible hypothesis than how to prove …

Gender Diversity In Corporate Boardrooms: Do Equal Seats Mean Equal Voices?, Nicolena Farias-Eisner

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This paper will first trace the history and evolution of gender diversity on boards. It then will assess why the growing trend toward greater gender diversity has become prevalent in recent years and the effects of this trend. Third, the paper will address the social impacts that increasing gender diversity on boards will place on companies. Lastly, this paper will conclude by discussing and suggesting policy implications that would enhance boardroom gender diversity and ultimately achieve gender equality.

Crashing The Boards: A Comparative Analysis Of The Boxing Out Of Women On Boards In The United States And Canada, Diana C. Nicholls Mutter

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This paper will first provide a critical, comparative look at the Canadian and the federal American responses to the under-representation of women on boards of large, publicly traded corporations. There will be a discussion about the competing conceptions which emerge in addressing the regulation of women on boards in the United States and Canada and why each jurisdiction implemented its policy when it did. The conceptions arising out of questions about under-representation of women on boards tend to fall within two categories: business case rationales and normative rationales. Given the competing conceptions of this issue, this paper will attempt to …

Technological And Institutional Crossroads: The Life And Times Of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Bernard C. Beaudreau

Seattle University Law Review

In this paper, I examine the life and times of Adolf A. Berle Jr., perhaps the most influential scholar in the field of corporate governance. Specifically, I examine his contribution in light of the technological and institutional changes that occurred in the late nineteenth century—changes that were germane to his thinking and understanding of corporate governance. I argue that, despite his perspicacity, he failed to appreciate the changing role of corporate officers—that is, from that of fiduciary agent to that of visionary, founder, and essential element in corporate success. Put differently, in the early twentieth century, the key asset in …

Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is elected. Proponents of “shareholder democracy” have advocated a shift to a majority voting rule in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.

Yet critics are sceptical as to whether majority voting improves board accountability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting …

Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho

Seattle University Law Review

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particular, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a matter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather than the shareholders’ interests alone. Its central insight is that the role of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as a “mediating …

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …

Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi

Seattle University Law Review

In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in …

Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair

Seattle University Law Review

In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …

Corporate Governance In Search Of The Shareholder-Manager Balance Of Power, Razeen Sappideen

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

Turning The Lights On: An Analysis Of The Fiduciary Duty Provisions Of The New York State Public Authority Reform Act, Adam Paul Gordon

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Board’S Duty To Monitor, Eric J. Pan

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.