Law Commons^™

Berle Viii: Benefit Corporations And The Firm Commitment Universe, Bart Houlahan, Andrew Kassoy, Jay Coen Gilbert

Seattle University Law Review

Benefit corporation law is a critical tool to allow private capital to be invested in a manner that creates shared and durable value for everyone. But a tool is only as good as the person who uses it. As highlighted in Rick Alexander’s essay, shareholders must understand the value of firm commitment, and, more importantly, the ultimate source of wealth for universal investors, which is thriving financial markets and a healthy, peaceful, and prosperous planet. These goals can only be attained and maintained for the long term if private capital is allocated and invested in a manner that creates value …

A Conversation With B Lab, Larry Hamermesh, Bart Houlahan, Rick Alexander, Dan Osusky

Seattle University Law Review

This is the panel of people who have been associated with B Lab for various lengths of time, but who really can put practical vision and facts before us in a way that the papers we’ve heard so far, while all really interesting, can’t quite do. All of these papers converge on this subject: what actually happens and what’s happened so far. So what I’m going to do is try to lead us through what could be an oral history, if it’s appropriately recorded, of B Lab. And thanks in large part to Rick Alexander, who knows the inside story …

Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Benjamin P. Edwards

Scholarly Works

Distributed ledger technology disrupts traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our Article examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.

This Article breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when distributed ledger technology solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …

Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose Ii: An Encouragement For Future Consideration From Professors Johnson And Millon, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper is the second in a series considering the argument that corporate laws that give only rights to stockholders somehow implicitly empower directors to regard other constituencies as equal ends in governance. This piece was written as part of a symposium honoring the outstanding work of Professors Lyman Johnson and David Millon, and it seeks to encourage Professors Johnson and Millon, as proponents of the view that corporations have no duty to make stockholder welfare the end of corporate law, to focus on the reality that corporate power translates into corporate purpose.

Drawing on examples of controlled companies that …

Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence From My Hometown, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper is the first in a series considering a rather tired argument in corporate governance circles, that corporate laws that give only rights to stockholders somehow implicitly empower directors to regard other constituencies as equal ends in governance. By continuing to suggest that corporate boards themselves are empowered to treat the best interests of other corporate constituencies as ends in themselves, no less important than stockholders, scholars and commentators obscure the need for legal protections for other constituencies and for other legal reforms that give these constituencies the means to more effectively protect themselves.

Using recent events in the …