Law Commons^™

Dissecting Hobby Lobby'S Corporate Person: A Procedural Proposal For Aligning Corporate Rights And Responsibilities, Andrew J. Fleming

Brooklyn Law Review

Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s corporate personhood decisions have allowed for the corporation to become increasingly more “person-like” by recognizing corporate constitutional rights that were previously reserved for flesh-and-blood human beings. Yet in cases where the rights of corporations are evaluated, the Court’s analysis flows from an axiomatic conceptualization of the corporation as a static, theoretical being, as if plucked straight from a business organizations law school textbook. The result is a gulf between corporate rights as “persons” and corporate legal responsibilities. Nowhere is that gulf more evident than in the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In particular, this …

Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A Proposed Response To The Roberts Court's Personification Of Corporations, Robert M. Ackerman, Lance Cole

Brooklyn Law Review

Both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are notable for the Roberts Court’s personification of the corporation. In Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court expanded corporate speech rights in a political context; in Hobby Lobby, it accorded religious rights to corporations in an unprecedented manner. This article explains how the Court’s expansion of corporate personification has ignored both traditional corporate law doctrine regarding shareholder primacy and the fundamental distinction in corporate law between the corporate entity and the shareholders who control it.

The article takes a communitarian approach to corporate law analysis, recognizing that corporations play useful roles …

The New Governance And The Challenge Of Litigation Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch

Brooklyn Law Review

Corporate governance mechanisms designed to ensure that managers act in shareholders’ interest have evolved dramatically over the past 40 years. “Old governance” mechanisms such as independent directors and performance-based executive compensation have been supplemented by innovations that give shareholders greater input into both the selection of directors and ongoing operational decisions. Issuer boards have responded with tools to limit the exercise of shareholder power both procedurally and substantively. This article terms the adoption and use of these tools, which generally take the form of structural provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws, the “new governance.”

Delaware law has largely taken …