Law Commons^™

Public(Ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations And The Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, Steven J. Haymore

Vanderbilt Law Review

During his 2007 commencement address at Harvard University, Bill Gates called on the graduates to invent "a more creative capitalism" where "we can stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or at least make a living, serving people who are suffering from the worst inequities." A number of entrepreneurs, including those that started online bookstore Better World Books ("BWB"), are doing their best to create a more creative capitalism. BWB sells approximately 10,000 books a day and brought in $30 million in revenue in 2010. BWB sells its products to return a profit …

Symposium On Executive Compensation Keynote Address, Kenneth R. Feinberg

Vanderbilt Law Review

I want to thank Richard Nagareda for inviting me to Vanderbilt; he's an old friend. I am very honored to return to Vanderbilt. I taught a course at Vanderbilt, and I loved teaching here. I loved going to the Country Music Hall of Fame and learning more about Patsy Cline and Johnny Cash. Really, it was great. I've already received an invitation from Dean Jim Bradford to come back to the business school and the law school and to participate in an interdisciplinary look at executive compensation. I hope to return. But when I saw that the Vanderbilt Law Review …

Comparing Ceo Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia And The United States, Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Law Review

This study compares CEO employment contracts across two common law countries: the United States and Australia. Although the regulatory regimes of these jurisdictions enjoy many comparable features, there are also some important institutional differences in terms of capital market, tax, and regulatory structures, which are discussed here. Debate has raged in the United States on the issue of whether executive compensation is efficient and determined at arm's length, or skewed by a power imbalance between managers and shareholders. A comparative analysis of the kind undertaken in our study provides an additional perspective on the optimal contracting and managerial power models …

Executive Compensation Consultants And Ceo Pay, Martin J. Conyon

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article surveys recent empirical studies on the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. The economic rationale for using executive compensation consultants is that they supply valuable data, information, and professional expertise to client firms. However, critics argue that the consultant's independence might be compromised because of conflicts of interest arising from the cross selling of business services or because of the consultant's desire to obtain repeat business. The emergent empirical evidence suggests that pay consultants are important in explaining executive compensation, although the findings are sometimes mixed and the precise effects of consultants on pay are yet to …

Insider Trading And Ceo Pay, M. Todd Henderson

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article presents evidence showing that boards of directors "bargain" with executives about the profits they expect to make from trades in firm stock. The evidence suggests that executives whose trading freedom increased using Rule 10b5-1 trading plans experienced reductions in other forms of pay to offset the potential gains from trading. There are two potential benefits from trading-portfolio optimization and informed trading profits- and this Article allows us to isolate them. The data show that boards pay executives in a way that reflects the profits they are expected to earn from informed trades. It also casts some doubt on …

Economics, Politics, And The International Principles For Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis Of Executive Pay At European Banks, Guido Ferrarini, Maria C. Ungureanu

Vanderbilt Law Review

In this Article, we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay at banks and suggest that there is no strong support for regulating bankers' compensation structures. We also argue that detailed regulation of incentives would subtract essential decisionmaking powers from boards of directors and make compensation structures too rigid.

In Part II we note that political support for regulating bankers' pay has been strong and …

Evolving Executive Equity Compensation And The Limits Of Optimal Contracting, David I. Walker

Vanderbilt Law Review

Executive equity compensation in the United States is evolving. At the turn of the millennium, stock options dominated the equity pay landscape, accounting for over half of the aggregate ex ante value of senior executive pay at large public companies, while restricted stock and similar compensation accounted for only about ten percent. Beginning in 2006, stock grants have displaced options as the single largest component of senior executive compensation at these firms. Accompanying this shift has been increased variation among companies in their relative emphasis on stock and options in equity pay packages. Both phenomena provide an opportunity for a …

Paying For Advice: The Role Of The Remuneration Consultant In U.K. Listed Companies, Ruth Bender

Vanderbilt Law Review

Compensation consultants are an integral part of the process of determining executive pay in large listed companies. This study reports interview-based research with protagonists in setting executive compensation in twelve FTSE 350 companies and addresses why the consultants are used, what they do, and how they are perceived.

Consultants have several important roles. Firstly, they act as experts, providing market data and advising on plan design and implementation. Because of this role, they not only guide their clients as to the requirements of the market, they also help create those selfsame market practices and norms. They also have a role …

Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel Iii, Wulf A. Kaal

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article is a rejoinder to a recent comment by Professor Romano on an earlier paper I coauthored with Christian Kirchner. Professor Romano suggests regulatory arbitrage, rather than the targeted regulation of bank lending to hedge funds under Basel II, as a hedge against systemic failure. I contend that it was not harmonization through Basel II but rather the profitability of certain assets and business strategies that caused banks to hold similar assets and engage in similar strategies. In particular, I find that the increasing role of hedge funds in the credit derivatives market, in combination with the market's recent …

Outsourcing Modularity, And The Theory Of The Firm, Margaret M. Blair, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Gregg Kirchhoefer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Firms have increasingly moved productive activities from within to outside the firm through outsourcing arrangements. According to some estimates, the value of outsourcing contracts has been nearly 100 billion dollars per year since 2004. Firm outsourcing happens for a number of reasons, including to save labor costs, capture the benefits of regulatory arbitrage, and take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of firm needs. We review a number of outsourcing contracts for evidence that contract techniques are used to help modularize the relationship between the firm and its service provider. Consistent with what modularity theory might predict, some …

Executive Compensation In The Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, And Officers' Fiduciary Duties, Randall Thomas, Harwell Wells

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article proposes a new approach to monitoring executive compensation. While the public seems convinced that executives at public corporations are paid too much, so far attempts to rein in executive compensation have met with little success. Several approaches have been tried - requiring large pay packages to consist predominantly of incentive pay, new procedures for approving pay, mobilization of public outrage at giant compensation packages. None, however, has stemmed the growth of executive compensation, or convinced opponents of large pay packages that such pay is either fair or deserved. Here we suggest a new approach, one that turns to …