Law Commons^™

Politics And The Business Corporation, Robert H. Sitkoff

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This essay explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-standing regulation of corporate political speech. The essay has three parts. First, it contends that the conventional justifications for regulating corporate interventions in politics -- that corporate donations unnaturally skew the political discourse (bad politics) and that corporate political donations harm shareholders (agency costs) -- assume irrational investors and substantial capital market inefficiency. Drawing on public choice theory, the essay also explores the aim of retarding rent-seeking as an alternative justification for regulating corporate interventions in politics. Second, the essay reexamines the history of the regulation …

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …

Trust Law, Corporate Law, And Capital Market Efficiency, Robert H. Sitkoff

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

In both the publicly-traded corporation and the private donative trust a crucial task is to minimize the agency costs that arise from the separation of risk-bearing and management. But where the law of corporate governance evolved in the shadow of capital-market checks on agency costs, trust governance did not. Thus, even more than that of close corporations, the law and study of private trusts offers an illuminating counterfactual -- a control, as it were -­ for a playful thought experiment about the importance of capital market efficiency to the law and study of public corporations. The animating idea for this …

Lawyers In The Perfect Storm, Mark A. Sargent

Working Paper Series

The multiple corporate collapses and scandals of recent years, for which "Enron" is a convenient shorthand, resulted from a perfect storm in which regulatory oversight, the law of fiduciary duty, gatekeepers, market discipline, and contractual incentives all failed to prevent gross self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and deception, or themselves produced perverse consequences. The story of this simultaneous failure of the structures in place since the New Deal and before, has received considerable attention in both the popular and scholarly literature, but is summarized here to provide a context for consideration of the contributions that lawyers made to the perfect storm. …

A Broader View Of Corporate Inversions: The Interplay Of Tax, Corporate And Economic Implications, Orsolya Kun

ExpressO

Multinational corporations have, in substantial numbers, moved their corporate residence from the U.S. to Bermuda, for the purpuse of minimizing U.S. taxation on their worldwide income. This study reviews the forms of these "corporate inversion transactions," and explores their tax implications, as well as their corporate governance implications and motivations. It is the first scholarly study to examine the corporate governance implications of inversions, and it concludes that previously unexplored aspects of the change of corporate domicile result in substantial reduction of accountability of directors and officers and significant impediments to enforcement of shareholder rights.

The Rational Exuberance Of Structuring Venture Capital Startups, Victor Fleischer

ExpressO

This Article takes the bursting of the dot com bubble as an opportunity to reevaluate the tax structure of venture capital startups. By organizing startups as corporations rather than as partnerships, investors and entrepreneurs seem to leave money on the table by failing to fully use tax losses -- especially since the vast majority of startups fail. Conventional wisdom attributes the lack of attention paid to losses to a "gambler's mentality" or optimism bias. I argue here that the use of the corporate form is, in fact, rational, or at least that there is a method to the madness.

I …

The Trajectory Of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, Brian R. Cheffins

ExpressO

While considerable attention is devoted to legal scholarship, little has been written on the process by which academic writing on law evolves. This paper departs from the existing pattern and examines five potential trajectories for legal scholarship. One is based on the idea that knowledge “accumulates” as part of “progress” towards a better understanding of the matters under study. The second is the concept of the “paradigm”, derived from work done on the history and sociology of science. The third focuses on the idea that academic endeavor concerning law yields useful ideas since market forces are at work. The fourth …

Corporate Governance After Enron And Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons For Cross-National Improvement, Edward S. Adams

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, And The Business Judgment Rule, Leonard M. Baynes

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

Beyond The Business Judgment Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Shareholders From Value-Reducing Acquisitions, Ryan Houseal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

During the takeover transactions of the 1980s, bidder firms paid target firm shareholders average premiums of approximately 50% for their shares. Did the sizable premiums paid to target firm shareholders during the 1980s reflect post-takeover improvement in the target's performance? Or were the premiums a result of the mismanagement of the bidder firms' assets?

The answer will help determine whether additional legal mechanisms should be established to protect bidder firm shareholders from the threat of management's consummation of value reducing acquisitions. Accordingly, this Note examines various studies which attempt to identify the source of the premiums paid to target firm …

The Provisional Director Remedy For Corporate Deadlock: A Proposed Model Statute, Susanna Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

The article discusses a unique remedy for shareholder and director deadlock within corporations: the appointment of provisional directors to corporate boards. Provisional directors are neutral third parties who are appointed by courts to act temporarily as tie-breaking directors in corporations paralyzed by deadlock. Provisional directors possess the same rights and powers of ordinary directors to vote at meetings. The provisional director remedy is a valuable dispute resolution mechanism that shares similarities with other alternative forms of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation, and a hybrid form called mediation-arbitration.

The appointment of a provisional director raises concerns about both the autonomy rights …

Premiums In Stock-For-Stock Mergers And Some Consequences In The Law Of Director Fiduciary Duties, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

All Faculty Scholarship

The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.

Sorting Through The Soup: How Do Llcs, Llps And Lllps Fit Withing The Regulations And Legal Doctrines?, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

In a children' book published in 1946, Ben Ross Berenberg described an imaginary amalgam called the churkendoose - "part chicken, turkey, duck and goose." In 1977, Wyoming invented a business law churkendoose: the limited liability company - part corporation, part general partnership, part limited partnership. That churkendoose has revolutionized the law of business organizations, becoming the vehicle of choice for tens of thousands of ventures every month and causing the IRS to radically overhaul its approach to taxing business entities. This article explores how preexisting regulatory and common law apply to LLCs and the related organizations known as limited liability …

When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer A Change Of Heart, Celia R. Taylor

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance In The Emerging Markets Of The Global Village: Latin And South America, Rhoda Karpatkin

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

Corporate governance scandals in America have focused public attention once again on global governance issues. Issues that are not solely corporate or business concerns, they have become public, political, and ethical concerns. They have become economic concerns, particularly due to the erosion of public confidence in the integrity of corporate leadership and the institutions that are charged with their oversight.

Improving Charitable Accountability, James J. Fishman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article focuses upon a persistent problem of the nonprofit sector--its lack of accountability to the public. Director, officer, and organizational responsibilities will be analyzed. Past and current approaches to secure accountability of charitable assets will be discussed, and a proposal for improving charitable accountability will be suggested through the creation of public-private charity commissions at the state level under the aegis of the attorney general.

Protection Against Unwarranted Searches And Seizures Of Corporate Premises Under Article 8 Of The European Convention On Human Rights: The Colas Est Sa V. France Approach, Marius Emberland

Michigan Journal of International Law

In this Article, the author considers the judgment delivered April 16, 2002, by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Colas Est SA v. France. The judgment concerned the interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests …

Oklahoma Shareholder And Director Inspection Rights: Useful Discovery Tools?, Johnathan D. Horton

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

All Faculty Scholarship

Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …

How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh

Articles

This article challenges our persistent path dependence on defunct distinctions between corporations and certain limited unincorporated associations. Recent federal tax regulations have inspired proposals for consolidated treatment of all limited business organizations through uniformly based or universally applicable statutes. I contend these proposals are preoccupied with how hybrid organizations such as the limited liability company and the limited liability partnership amalgamate, and thus implicitly preserve, traditional dichotomies between corporations and partnership categorizations as well as entities and aggregate theories. The continued use of these schemes compromises the legal basis for such proposals.

By critically examining certain jurisdictional principles, this article …

Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors’ professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal’s control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors’ duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a …

Competition, Corporate Responsibility, And The China Question, Jospeh Vining

Other Publications

"Corporate responsibility" is not a peripheral matter. It is at the core of all decision-making on behalf of business corporations under American law. This paper examines the effort to add an exemption for "business" in corporate form to the exemptions from ordinary responsibility that are seen in other areas of activity - e.g., for the military, for lawyers in adversarial litigation, or for investigators in scientific research. It looks at a number of well known cases and points to the often neglected relevance of both the criminal law applicable to corporations as such, and the evolving professional responsibility of corporate …

The Case For Repealing The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, Terrence R. Chorvat, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Foreword: Revisiting Gilson And Kraakman’S Efficiency Story, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gilson and Kraakman's ‘Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ is part of the canon of modem corporate law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly influenced the way we think about the field. It is also enigmatic, warranting a fresh look by those who think they know what it says from some long-ago reading or second-hand references by other authors.

Innovation In Corporate Law, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West

Faculty Scholarship

In most countries large business enterprises today are organized as corporations. The corporation with its key attributes of independent personality, limited liability and free tradeability of shares has played a key role in most developed market economies since the 19th century and has made major inroads in emerging markets. We suggest that the resilience of the corporate form is a function of the adaptability of the legal framework to a changing environment. We analyze a country's capacity to innovate using the rate of statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate law, and institutional change as indicators. Our findings suggest that …

Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do is talk about the big picture, as John suggested, and consider the likely spillover effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. I want to do this in a discretely administrative law-oriented way, taking two themes that were very visible and driving forces behind the legislation. The first, as Mary suggested in her opening remarks, is a question about federalism. It has been common for the last twenty years, at least, to trot out - as John just did - a distinction between federal and state spheres of competency. The SEC is on the disclosure side, while the substance of …

Litigator's Thumbnail Guide To The Warn Act, David A. Santacroce

Articles

When large companies choose to lay off workers or close down plants without prior notice, they can be subject to extensive liability under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), including 60 days backpay to all affected workers, daily fines to local government, and attorney fees generated during the suit. In the following article, the author presents the bare bones basics of WARN in order for employees and their advocates to understand how and when WARN applies.