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Full-Text Articles in Law
Executive Compensation In The Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, And Officers' Fiduciary Duties, Randall Thomas, Harwell Wells
Executive Compensation In The Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, And Officers' Fiduciary Duties, Randall Thomas, Harwell Wells
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article proposes a new approach to monitoring executive compensation. While the public seems convinced that executives at public corporations are paid too much, so far attempts to rein in executive compensation have met with little success. Several approaches have been tried - requiring large pay packages to consist predominantly of incentive pay, new procedures for approving pay, mobilization of public outrage at giant compensation packages. None, however, has stemmed the growth of executive compensation, or convinced opponents of large pay packages that such pay is either fair or deserved. Here we suggest a new approach, one that turns to …
The Sec Staff's "Cybersecurity Disclosure" Guidance: Will It Help Investors Or Cyber-Thieves More?, Sarah Jane Hughes, Roland L. Trope
The Sec Staff's "Cybersecurity Disclosure" Guidance: Will It Help Investors Or Cyber-Thieves More?, Sarah Jane Hughes, Roland L. Trope
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
All Faculty Scholarship
Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.
Using the …