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The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund
The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund
Scholarly Works
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time. As a result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no longer warranted.
A number of corporate governance mechanisms have evolved to duplicate …
A Tax Response To The Executive Pay Problem, David I. Walker
A Tax Response To The Executive Pay Problem, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Many observers believe that that the public company executive labor market is deficient and results in systematically excessive compensation. This Article accepts that premise and considers potential regulatory responses. Specifically, this Article proposes and analyzes a two-pronged tax response to the problem of excessive executive pay – the imposition of a surtax on executive pay in excess of a threshold combined with investor tax relief. These two prongs respond to the chief concerns raised by excessive executive pay. The imposition of a surtax would reduce the after-tax income of executives, which would directly address the unfairness of excessive pay and …
Executive Compensation In The Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, And Officers' Fiduciary Duties, Randall Thomas, Harwell Wells
Executive Compensation In The Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, And Officers' Fiduciary Duties, Randall Thomas, Harwell Wells
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article proposes a new approach to monitoring executive compensation. While the public seems convinced that executives at public corporations are paid too much, so far attempts to rein in executive compensation have met with little success. Several approaches have been tried - requiring large pay packages to consist predominantly of incentive pay, new procedures for approving pay, mobilization of public outrage at giant compensation packages. None, however, has stemmed the growth of executive compensation, or convinced opponents of large pay packages that such pay is either fair or deserved. Here we suggest a new approach, one that turns to …