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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Problem With The “Non-Class” Class: An Urgent Call For Improved Gatekeepers In Merger Objection Litigation, Josh Molder
The Problem With The “Non-Class” Class: An Urgent Call For Improved Gatekeepers In Merger Objection Litigation, Josh Molder
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Until recently, class actions dominated merger objection litigation. However, plaintiff’s lawyers have constructed a “non-class” class where an individual suit can benefit from the leverage of a certified class without ever meeting the stringent class certification requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. This new development has initiated a shift in merger objection litigation where plaintiffs are increasingly filing individual suits instead of class actions. However, this shift has left shareholders vulnerable to collusive settlements because plaintiff’s attorneys have significant control over these suits and a strong incentive to settle quickly for a substantial fee. Additionally, corporate defendants are …
Enforcing The Bargain V. Materiality Requirement: The Future Of Disclosure-Only Settlements Post-Trulia, Hao Jiang
Pace Law Review
In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from its tradition of routinely approving disclosure-only settlements and required disclosures to be material in order to cure the conflict of interest between plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class. I argue that fairness of settlement is the only standard in approving class action settlements and fairness will not be achieved by requiring materiality. Shareholders are legally entitled to all material information, as the board’s fiduciary duty dictates. Thus, material disclosures are enforcement of a legal duty that is no consideration for the release of shareholder claims. …
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law. Nearly every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class action suits. Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire. Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the corporation to make changes to its governing documents. These suits distract directors and management from the core …
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
Michigan Law Review
Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …
Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park
Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park
Michigan Law Review
Securities class actions are often criticized as wasteful strike suits that target temporary fluctuations in the stock prices of otherwise healthy companies. The securities class actions brought by investors of Enron and WorldCom, companies that fell into bankruptcy in the wake of fraud, resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars in permanent shareholder losses and provide a powerful counterexample to this critique. An issuer's bankruptcy may affect how judges and parties perceive securities class actions and their merits, yet little is known about the subset of cases where the company is bankrupt. This is the first extensive empirical study …
Inequities In The Resolution Of Securities Disputes: Individual Or Class Action; Arbitration Or Litigation, Farah Z. Usmani
Inequities In The Resolution Of Securities Disputes: Individual Or Class Action; Arbitration Or Litigation, Farah Z. Usmani
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.