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Full-Text Articles in Law
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …
Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So "Say On Pay" Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii
Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So "Say On Pay" Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii
University of Miami Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …
We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders' Voices Be Heard Or Stifled When Nominating Directors? How The Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute To Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, Rose A. Zukin
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch
Improving The Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance The Innovative New Business Form, Steven Munch
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
In recent years, a number of states have offered innovative new business forms to accommodate social enterprises, organizations that pursue both profit and social purpose. These hybrid forms are designed to free socially conscious entrepreneurs from the strict pursuit of shareholder value maximization that often controls in business practice and law, allowing them instead to serve the interests of other company stakeholders or even society. One form, the benefit corporation, has been adopted by seven states and is now under consideration in several more. This Note details the development, provisions, and advantages of the benefit corporation. It also identifies and …
Venture Capital Investments In China: The Use Of Offshore Financing Structures And Corporate Relocations, Jing Li
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Based on an analysis of the relevant Chinese laws and regulations governing the corporate governance structure of venture capital (“VC”)-invested firms, as well as a discussion on the feasibility of employing different alternatives to make direct and indirect VC investments in Chinese portfolio firms, this article studies a hand-collected sample consisting of the twenty-nine VCbacked Chinese portfolio firms that have been financed and listed from 1990 to 2005 in order to empirically show how these investments were actually made in practice. The findings show that twenty-three out of the twentynine firms received their VC investments in various offshore holding entities, …