Law Commons^™

The Case Of Ceo Richard Grasso And The Nyse: Proposals For Controlling Executive Compensation At Public Nonprofit Corporations, Rachel Penski

Vanderbilt Law Review

In August 2003, for the first time in its 200-year history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) announced the compensation package for its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. The NYSE's Board of Directors revealed in a press release that it had distributed $139.5 million in deferred compensation to its CEO Richard Grasso. This payment was in addition to a base salary of $1.4 million with an annual bonus of $1 million. Due to the Exchange's status as a nonprofit corporation, Grasso's payout "led to an outcry, as [his compensation was] more in line with what chief executives of public corporations …

Managers' Fiduciary Duty Upon The Firm's Insolvency: Accounting For Performance Creditors, Alon Chaver, Jesse M. Fried

Vanderbilt Law Review

A corporation's managers generally owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. Legal scholars interpret this duty as requiring the managers to maximize shareholder value. When a firm is solvent, the obligation to maximize shareholder value tends to give managers an incentive to deploy firm assets efficiently-that is, in a way that maximizes total value.

When a firm is insolvent, however, the duty to maximize shareholder value could lead managers to take actions that reduce the value of debt more than they increase the value of equity and therefore reduce total value. Accordingly, a number of courts have …

Shift Of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope Of Directors' Duty To Creditors, Laura Lin

Vanderbilt Law Review

In the wake of the debt binge of the 1980s, the number of financially distressed corporations has increased dramatically.' Because a struggling company rarely ceases operations overnight, directors still need to make investment and operational decisions concerning the best use of the company's existing assets. This need remains whether the firm will regain profitability or will be liquidated. Financial distress also intensifies conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. Indeed, when these constituencies are unable to recover their investments in the corporation because of insufficient assets, both shareholders and creditors have incentives to maximize their individual returns regard- less of …

Conclusion, Christopher C. Whitson --Special Project Editor, Thomas A. D'Ambrosio, Patricia A. Daniel, Kathryn N. Fine, Robert P. Mckinney, Marcia M. Mcmurray, Bennet L. Ross

Vanderbilt Law Review

Despite recent responses designed to combat the increased liability exposure of directors and officers, the personal risks for corporate insiders remain significant. With corporations operating in an ever-complex regulatory maze, there has been an increased focus on corporate accountability. The difficulty in resolving director and officer liability issues, however, arises in balancing the need to punish misguided fiduciaries with the need to protect aggressive managers who take good faith risks to produce increased corporate profits. While long-range solutions to this balancing problem are essential, directors and officers should pursue short-term tactics to reduce their risk of personal liability.

Because it …