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Business Organizations Law

Michigan Law Review

Risk

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann Mar 2013

Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann

Michigan Law Review

The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …


Daedalean Tinkering, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2006

Daedalean Tinkering, Sean J. Griffith

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Review describes Skeel's account of corporate scandal, focusing on the central theme of excessive risk-taking. Part II examines Skeel's most original policy proposal-the creation of an investor insurance scheme to protect against excessive risk. Although the proposal takes up only a few pages of the book, it targets the books' core concern-the risk of corporate fraud. In evaluating the proposed investor insurance regime, this Review raises a set of objections based on cost and administrability and argues that an insurance regime would be duplicative of existing mechanisms that effectively spread the risk of financial fraud. Part …


Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr. Oct 1986

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …