Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Lack Of Marketability And Minority Discounts In Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness And Judicial Synchrony In Pursuit Of Equitable Consensus, Stephen J. Leacock
Lack Of Marketability And Minority Discounts In Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness And Judicial Synchrony In Pursuit Of Equitable Consensus, Stephen J. Leacock
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky
The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky
Faculty Scholarship
Does the idea of “unfair competition” present the law with a viable alternative to thinking about the regulation of information and informational resources, independent of the traditional categories of the common law (e.g., property/tort) and the assumptions that these categories entail? In this chapter, we argue that, although the answer to that question is no, unfair competition nevertheless plays an important role in complementing the categories of property and torts as they apply to competitive settings. Specifically, unfair competition allows courts to both broaden and narrow the traditional notions of property and torts – especially as they apply to the …
Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, D. Gordon Smith, Masako Ueda
Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, D. Gordon Smith, Masako Ueda
Faculty Scholarship
In this essay, we sketch the outlines of a research agenda exploring links between courts and entrepreneurship. Our conception of law and entrepreneurship encompasses the study of positive law (including constitutions, statutes, and regulations), common law doctrines, and private ordering that relate to the discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities by new firms. We briefly survey the economics literatures that relate to law and entrepreneurship, including the law and finance literature launched by the work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV). Relying on the suggestive work of LLSV and other economists who have labored …
Legal Ground Rules In Coordinated And Liberal Market Economies, Katharina Pistor
Legal Ground Rules In Coordinated And Liberal Market Economies, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter seeks to explain the affinity between the nature of economic systems: coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) on the one hand, and legal origin (civil vs common law systems) on the other. It starts with the simple observation that LMEs tend to be common law jurisdictions, and CMEs civil law jurisdictions. It proposes that the affinity between economic and legal system offers important insights into the foundations of different types of market economies and, in particular, differences in the scope of the state vs the powers of the individual. The main argument is that the …
Sorting Through The Soup: How Do Llcs, Llps And Lllps Fit Withing The Regulations And Legal Doctrines?, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Sorting Through The Soup: How Do Llcs, Llps And Lllps Fit Withing The Regulations And Legal Doctrines?, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
In a children' book published in 1946, Ben Ross Berenberg described an imaginary amalgam called the churkendoose - "part chicken, turkey, duck and goose." In 1977, Wyoming invented a business law churkendoose: the limited liability company - part corporation, part general partnership, part limited partnership. That churkendoose has revolutionized the law of business organizations, becoming the vehicle of choice for tens of thousands of ventures every month and causing the IRS to radically overhaul its approach to taxing business entities. This article explores how preexisting regulatory and common law apply to LLCs and the related organizations known as limited liability …
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this Article is to examine the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as it applies in the context of preliminary negotiations, from the viewpoint of the economic theory of rational choice. This is part of a larger project that attempts to understand better the regulatory role of contract formation law generally. From a regulatory vantage point, estoppel and related legal doctrines operate as economic regulations; they shape the bargaining process by influencing the negotiators' incentives to make and to rely on preliminary communications. As with all economic regulations, however, some rules do better than others at promoting efficient exchange, …