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Business Organizations Law

Faculty Scholarship

Series

2015

Equity compensation

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker Oct 2015

The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly performance shares, have displaced stock options as the primary instrument for compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S. This article examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an investor’s perspective. Notable observations include the following: Although technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive characteristics of options. But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at the money options. Performance share plans can be …


Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer Jan 2015

Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …