Law Commons^™

Qualitative Standards For Qualified Securities: Sec Regulation Of Voting Rights, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Independent Corporate Board: A Means To What End?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Election Of Directors And Chapter 11--The Second Circuit Tells Stockholders To Walk Softly And Carry A Big Lever, Michael A. Gerber

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance Of Substitutes, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The proposal of the New York Stock Exchange to end its prohibition on listing the securities of companies with dual classes of common stock has focused public policy debate over this evolution in capital structure both too broadly and too narrowly.

The debate has been too broad because it has encompassed one situation – an initial public offering by a company with a capital structure containing dual class common stock – that should not be controversial at all. Whatever may have originally prompted the New York Stock Exchange's longstanding prohibition against listing non-voting common stock or common stock with voting …

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulation Of Radiation Hazards In The Workplace: Present Problems And New Approaches To Reproductive Health, Michael S. Baram, Neal Smith

Faculty Scholarship

On December 20, 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed revisions to its Standards for Protection Against Radiation [hereinafter Standards].¹ If adopted, the new Standards will provide additional protection for millions of workers and their unborn children. The effects of the Standards will extend, however, far beyond the health of those exposed to radiation. Specifically, the NRC's proposal may provide a new paradigm for regulating health hazards that have no safe threshold level of exposure. It will also focus debate on whether or not women should be precluded from working in fetotoxic environments

The Future Of Corporate Federalism: State Competition And The New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What sensible compromise can be struck between Bill Cary's and Ralph Winter's views of the competition among states for corporate charters? This is the relevant question to ask in response to Professor Romano's stimulating paper, because if one ends in an intermediate position between Cary and Winter (as she does and as I do), then one needs to focus on the protections shareholders should be accorded both to protect them from exploitation at the hands of a state pursuing tax revenues and from excessive regulation by a state whose regulatory efforts are intended in fact to realize ulterior objectives unrelated …