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Reconsidering The Evolutionary Erosion Account Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Reconsidering The Evolutionary Erosion Account Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
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This Article reconsiders the dominant account of corporate law’s duty of loyalty, which asserts that the courts have steadily relaxed standards of fiduciary scrutiny applied to self-dealing by corporate managers across more than a century of history—to the great detriment of the shareholder interest. The account originated in Harold Marsh, Jr.’s foundational article, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, published in The Business Lawyer in 1966. Marsh’s showing of historical lassitude has been successfully challenged in a recent book by Professor David Kershaw. This Article takes Professor Kershaw’s critique a step further, asking whether the evolutionary …
The Expressive Function Of Directors’ Duties To Creditors, Jonathan C. Lipson
The Expressive Function Of Directors’ Duties To Creditors, Jonathan C. Lipson
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This Article offers an explanation of the “doctrine” of directors’ duties to creditors. Courts frequently say—but rarely hold—that corporate directors owe duties to or for the benefit of corporate creditors when the corporation is in distress. These cases are puzzling for at least two reasons. First, they link fiduciary duty to priority in right of payment, effectively treating creditors as if they were shareholders, at least for certain purposes. But this ignores the fact that priority is a complex and volatile concept. Moreover, contract and other rights at law usually protect creditors, even (especially) when a firm is distressed. It …
Self-Handicapping And Managers’ Duty Of Care, David A. Hoffman
Self-Handicapping And Managers’ Duty Of Care, David A. Hoffman
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This symposium essay focuses on the relationship between managers' duty of care and self-handicapping, or constructing obstacles to performance with the goal of influencing subsequent explanations about outcomes. Conventional explanations for failures of caretaking by managers have focused on motives (greed) and incentives (agency costs). This account of manager behavior has led some modern jurists, concerned about recent corporate scandals, to advocate for stronger deterrent measures to realign manager and shareholder incentives. * Self-handicapping theory, by contrast, teaches that bad manager behavior may occur even when incentives are well-aligned. Highly successful individuals in particular come to fear the pressure of …