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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Independent Board As Shield, Gregory H. Shill
The Independent Board As Shield, Gregory H. Shill
Washington and Lee Law Review
The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of institutions: the independent board of directors and the business judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead.
Numerous defects in the design and practice of the independent board …
Real Insider Trading, Michael A. Perino
Real Insider Trading, Michael A. Perino
Washington and Lee Law Review
In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to assess …
Adversarial Failure, Benjamin P. Edwards
Adversarial Failure, Benjamin P. Edwards
Washington and Lee Law Review
Investors, industry firms, and regulators all rely on vital public records to assess risk and evaluate securities industry personnel. Despite the information’s importance, an arbitration-facilitated expungement process now regularly deletes these public records. Often, these arbitrations recommend that public information be deleted without any true adversary ever providing any critical scrutiny to the requests. In essence, poorly informed arbitrators facilitate removing public information out of public databases. Interventions aimed at surfacing information may yield better informed decisions. Although similar problems have emerged in other contexts when adversarial systems break down, the expungement process to purge information about financial professionals provides …
Contract Design, Default Rules, And Delaware Corporate Law, Jeffrey Manns, Robert Anderson
Contract Design, Default Rules, And Delaware Corporate Law, Jeffrey Manns, Robert Anderson
Washington and Lee Law Review
Incomplete contract theory recognizes that contracts cannot be comprehensive and that state law necessarily has to fill in gaps when conflicts arise. The more complex the transaction, the more that lawyers face practical constraints that force them to limit the scope of drafting and broadly rely on legal defaults and open-ended terms to plug holes and address contingencies. In theory Delaware law serves as lawyers’ preferred jurisdiction and forum for merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions and other high-end corporate deals because of the state’s superior default rules for corporate law and its judiciary’s expertise in discerning the “hypothetical bargain” of …
Delaware As Deal Arbiter, Christina M. Sautter
Delaware As Deal Arbiter, Christina M. Sautter
Washington and Lee Law Review
Most would agree that the Delaware courts are the leading jurists in the resolution of corporate conflicts, particularly in the Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) context. Arguably a greater role that Delaware plays is that of a norm setter, both with respect to the expectations of management conduct in the M&A process and with respect to deal terms, particularly deal protection devices. Like in any relationship, there is a “give and take” between practitioners and Delaware. That is, practitioners are “on the front lines,” often innovating with respect to new deal structures and deal terms. After some time, Delaware has the …
The Lost Lessons Of Shareholder Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson
The Lost Lessons Of Shareholder Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson
Washington and Lee Law Review
Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation, and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past. These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes. This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes in merger litigation and the longer history of …
Artificial Entities With Natural Rights: Pursuing Profits At The Expense Of Human Capital, Loren M. Findlay
Artificial Entities With Natural Rights: Pursuing Profits At The Expense Of Human Capital, Loren M. Findlay
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
This Note explores the legal and constitutional rights granted to corporations and highlights how these corporate benefits are often at the expense of individuals. Over the past century, the corporation has evolved, taking on human-like characteristics. While many statutes and the Constitution use the word “person,” courts have inconsistently interpreted the definition of “person” in determining when it expands to corporations. In courts’ ad hoc analysis and interpretation, individuals get the metaphorical short-end of the stick.
The First Amendment of the Constitution was interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to afford the right of free speech to corporations in the …
“No More No-Poach”: An Antitrust Plaintiff’S Guide, Amanda Triplett
“No More No-Poach”: An Antitrust Plaintiff’S Guide, Amanda Triplett
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
It may seem that agreements between employers not to hire or solicit employees from each other would be illegal under the Sherman Act’s prohibition of conspiracies to fix prices or allocate markets. However, the complexity of this issue pushes the boundaries of antitrust law. But the core principals of antitrust law are tailored to reject them. In a market of employers, where firms are competitors, no-poach restraints have horizontal elements subject to a harsher standard of antitrust review. Firms that enter into these arrangements bypass legal methods to protect against the harms of employee loss, such as a non-compete agreement. …
Compliance As An Exchange Of Legitimacy For Influence, In The Oxford Handbook Of Global Legal Pluralism (Paul Schiff Berman Ed., 2020), Kishanthi Parella
Compliance As An Exchange Of Legitimacy For Influence, In The Oxford Handbook Of Global Legal Pluralism (Paul Schiff Berman Ed., 2020), Kishanthi Parella
Books and Chapters
This chapter explains that business actors comply with legally nonbinding institutions because of an exchange between legitimacy and influence. Specifically, the information effects produced by both binding and nonbinding institutions can cause reputational damage to a company. To regain its legitimacy, that company associates itself with a more reputable organization than itself, regaining legitimacy through that association. However, that association often comes at a price. In exchange for conferring legitimacy, the external organization will promote its own institutions for the company’s adoption. Companies therefore adopt these institutions in order to credibly signal the quality of their association with the external …
Hard And Soft Law Preferences In Business And Human Rights, Kishanthi Parella
Hard And Soft Law Preferences In Business And Human Rights, Kishanthi Parella
Scholarly Articles
States and non-state actors, such as business organizations and NGOs, have varying preferences among regulatory options in business and human rights. Some actors prefer soft law governance while others advocate for legally binding solutions at the national and international levels. In this essay, I explore some of the factors that may explain why state and non-state actors hold these diverse preferences. I conclude that while some of these preferences may be attributable to the unique advantages of soft lawor hard law, other preferences likely depend on the effects produced by the interaction of both types of law within the broader …
Boards In Information Governance, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan
Boards In Information Governance, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan
Scholarly Articles
This Article focuses on the evolving role of boards of directors. It charts the decline of the two leading, twentieth-century conceptual frameworks shaping corporate boards’ roles: agency cost theory, which produced the limited “monitoring board,” and “separate realms” theory, which ceded board responsibility for matters other than profit maximization to government regulation. Hedge fund activism and wild stock market swings have exposed the limits of the board’s role in agency cost theory. The 2020 pandemic, economic crises, investors’ demands for socially responsible stewardship, and corporations’ own political activism have rendered separate realms thinking untenable.
Although much theorizing in corporate law …