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Full-Text Articles in Law
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded For Loyalty? European Experiments On The Wedge Between Tenured Voting And Takeover Law, Chiara Mosca
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded For Loyalty? European Experiments On The Wedge Between Tenured Voting And Takeover Law, Chiara Mosca
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its most tangible expression in the “one share, one vote” principle. While, in the political landscape, the “one person, one vote” standard is absolute dogma and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the one share, one vote principle is constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have …
Unraveling China's Capital Market Growth: A Political Economy Account, Tamar Groswald Ozery
Unraveling China's Capital Market Growth: A Political Economy Account, Tamar Groswald Ozery
SJD Dissertations
With modern, successful firms that operate globally and a capital market that is the second largest in the world, corporate governance in China has long passed the point of an “adjust or perish” prognostic. Yet its firm governance and capital market functions maintain strong idiosyncrasies that go against many fundamentals in economics and legal thought. These idiosyncrasies are products of the underlying configurations of China’s political economy and the shifts within it. Political economy in China has a determinant role on the ways corporate ownership is organized, firms operate, and the capital market functions. It is responsible for many of …