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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Federal Chartering Revisited, Donald E. Schwartz
Federal Chartering Revisited, Donald E. Schwartz
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The protections that corporation law provided to shareholders and to our economic community against the excesses and complacency of corporate directors and managers have undergone a general weakening. Although it is uncertain whether the ALI can accomplish effective and meaningful reforms, this effort may be the most important attempt by the corporate community to reform itself.
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed "managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers' rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise. But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when managers hang on to their jobs after they have become inefficient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent directors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial abuses. This is the message …
Two Models Of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle And Means, Lynne L. Dallas
Two Models Of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle And Means, Lynne L. Dallas
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article introduces a new model of corporate governance, which challenges, as did Berle and Means, the conclusions drawn from the traditional ownership model. Rather than focusing upon the inefficiencies of the large complex firm resulting from the separation of share ownership and control, however, this new model, which I call the power model, focuses upon the political nature of decision making in the large corporation, which exists regardless of the identity of the entrepreneur.
Introduction, Joel Seligman
Introduction, Joel Seligman
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Introduction for the 1988 Journal of Law Reform Symposium: Issues in Corporate Governance.
Corporate Auctions And Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, Steven G. Bradbury
Corporate Auctions And Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, Steven G. Bradbury
Michigan Law Review
This Note proposes a rationale and a methodology for applying the business judgment rule when directors resist a hostile bid during the auction phase of a control contest. Part I examines the changes that occur in the responsibilities of target directors when a corporate auction is initiated. This Part describes the Unocal business judgment rule test and discusses its usefulness in the auction phase of a takeover. While the test requires modification if it is to complement effectively the auction-phase duties announced in Revlon, this Part suggests that the business judgment rule continues to be relevant and important during …
The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth
The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth
Michigan Law Review
The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the problems associated with two-tier tender offers and the closely related, and perhaps still more coercive, partial tender offer. Second, the article will address the natural question why such offers have not already been banned, suggesting a better view of what coercion means in the context of a tender offer. Third, the article will offer a management-oriented view of coercion, explaining the legitimate interests of managers (and other groups) in resisting takeovers, as well as how greenmail and poison pills, though subject to abuse, can be used quite properly to combat …
Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons And Limitations Of Industrial Policy, Steven R. Englund
Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons And Limitations Of Industrial Policy, Steven R. Englund
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons and Limitations of Industrial Policy edited by Hugh Patrick
Corporations And Society: Power And Responsibility, Sara Anne Engle
Corporations And Society: Power And Responsibility, Sara Anne Engle
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility edited by Warren J. Samuels and Arthur S. Miller
Adventures In Finance, Deborah A. Demott
Adventures In Finance, Deborah A. Demott
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy: Theory, Practice, and Policy by Merritt B. Fox
The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, And Government In The American Economy, James R. Steffen
The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, And Government In The American Economy, James R. Steffen
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, and Government in the American Economy by Walter Adams and James W. Brock
Should General Utilities Be Reinstated To Provide Partial Integration Of Corporate And Personal Income—Is Half A Loaf Better Than None?, Douglas A. Kahn
Should General Utilities Be Reinstated To Provide Partial Integration Of Corporate And Personal Income—Is Half A Loaf Better Than None?, Douglas A. Kahn
Articles
The General Utilities doctrine is the name given to the now largely defunct tax rule that a corporation does not recognize a gain or a loss on making a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution of an appreciated or depreciated asset to its shareholders. The roots of the doctrine, can be traced to a regulation promulgated in 1919 that denied realization of gain or loss to a corporation when making a liquidating distribution of an asset in kind. No regulatory provision existed which specified the extent to which realization would or would not be triggered by a nonliquidating distribution such as a …