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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese Sep 2019

The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.


Limitations On Corporate Speech: Protection For Shareholders Or Abridgement Of Expression?, Alan J. Meese Sep 2019

Limitations On Corporate Speech: Protection For Shareholders Or Abridgement Of Expression?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.


Individual Or Collective Liability For Corporate Directors?, Darian M. Ibrahim Sep 2019

Individual Or Collective Liability For Corporate Directors?, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

Fiduciary duty is one of the most litigated areas in corporate law and the subject of much academic attention, yet one important question has been ignored: Should fiduciary liability be assessed individually, where directors are examined one-by-one for compliance, or collectively, where the board's compliance as a whole is all that matters? The choice between individual and collective assessment may be the difference between a director's liability and her exoneration, may affect how boards function, and informs the broader fiduciary duty literature in important ways. This Article is the first to explore the individual/collective question and suggest a systematic way …


Freezing The Company Charter, Eric Kades Sep 2019

Freezing The Company Charter, Eric Kades

Eric A. Kades

When legislatures alter corporate, partnership, and other business entity statutes, they simultaneously amend the governing document of all entities of that type formed within the jurisdiction. In many circumstances these business entities may wish to retain existing rules for internal governance. This Article offers a novel tool for firms wishing to so manage their own legal transitions: the "charter freeze." A freeze provision in the company charter declares that future (non-mandatory) changes in relevant statutes have no effect on the firm. Owners may affirmatively adopt the new rules, but choose to exercise complete control over their adoption vel non of …


The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol Jul 2017

The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol

Poonam Puri

The role of corporate and securities laws in addressing foreign corrupt business practices have, to date, received limited consideration. Departing from the substantial literature on the criminal and public law response to international corruption, the authors analyze Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act in comparison with British and American legislation and conclude that the Canadian regime relies too heavily on the use of criminal sanctions and fails to contemplate the role of behaviour modification in its legislative structure. Recognizing that multinational corporations are well placed to identify, expose, and prevent corrupt business practices, the authors propose a private law-based …


Triumph Or Tragedy? The Curious Path Of Corporate Disclosure Reform In The U.K., Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley Jul 2017

Triumph Or Tragedy? The Curious Path Of Corporate Disclosure Reform In The U.K., Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley

Cynthia A. Williams

No abstract provided.


Rethinking The Nature Of The Firm: The Corporation As A Governance Object, Peer Zumbansen Aug 2016

Rethinking The Nature Of The Firm: The Corporation As A Governance Object, Peer Zumbansen

Peer Zumbansen

This Article attempts to bridge two discourses—corporate governance and contract governance. Regarding the latter, a group of scholars has recently set out to develop a more comprehensive research agenda to explore the governance dimensions of contractual relations, highlighting the potential of contract theory to develop a more encompassing theory of social and economic transactions. While a renewed interest in the contribution of economic theory for a concept of contract governance drives one dimension of this research, another part of this undertaking has been to move contract theory closer to theories of social organization. Here, these scholars emphasize the “social” or …


On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn Stout Feb 2015

On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn Stout

Lynn A. Stout

In their 1932 opus "The Modern Corporation and Public Property," Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of a new economic entity—the public corporation. What made the public corporation “public,” of course, was that it had thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm’s shareholders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve …


Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman Nov 2014

Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are fundamental to the stewardship of economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the post 2008-2009 recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. The duties and responsibilities of a corporate director include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. This paper results from the author’s previously assembled biographical data for most …


Shareholder Engagement Through Informal Dialogue: A Perspective From Spanish Listed Companies, Javier Agudo Jul 2014

Shareholder Engagement Through Informal Dialogue: A Perspective From Spanish Listed Companies, Javier Agudo

Javier Agudo

The purpose of this research is to further understand the behaviour of listed companies in the informal dialogue with their shareholders. While dialogue in CSR issues and the relations between IR officers and funds had already been studied, additional exploration was needed on dialogue regarding corporate governance and on the role of other company actors and external advisors in it. For this, a qualitative study was undertaken in the Spanish context. A total of eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with directors of the board, heads of investor relations and secretaries of the board from various listed companies, together with proxy …


Corporate Culture And Erm, Michelle M. Harner Jul 2013

Corporate Culture And Erm, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

The attitudes and actions of those viewed as leaders within a company (commonly referred to as “tone at the top”) help to define corporate culture and are critical to implementing a successful enterprise risk management (ERM) program. This paper explores the challenges and benefits of creating a risk-aware corporate culture, including the potential legal implications for boards of directors.


Re-Enchanting The Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson Jan 2013

Re-Enchanting The Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

No abstract provided.


Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner Jan 2013

Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner

Christopher M. Bruner

In this article I argue that crisis-driven corporate governance reform efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom that aim to empower shareholders are misguided, and offer an explanation of why policymakers in each country have reacted to the financial crisis as they have. I first discuss the risk incentives of shareholders and managers in financial firms, and examine how excessive leverage and risk-taking in pursuit of short-term returns for shareholders led to the crisis. I then describe the far greater power and centrality that U.K. shareholders have historically possessed relative to their U.S. counterparts, and explore historical and …


El Traje Nuevo Del Emperador, Diego G. Pardow, Rodrigo Vallejo May 2012

El Traje Nuevo Del Emperador, Diego G. Pardow, Rodrigo Vallejo

Diego G. Pardow

This note is a public policy analysis on the duty of state-owned corporations to disclose their executive compensation plans.


Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee Jones, Michelle Welsh Feb 2012

Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee Jones, Michelle Welsh

Renee Jones

This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant model of corporate governance, the principal function of the board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society at large. Despite general agreement on the importance of director oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts tout the importance of board …


Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones Nov 2011

Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …


Creditors And Debt Governance.Pdf, Charles K. Whitehead Feb 2011

Creditors And Debt Governance.Pdf, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

This chapter from the book Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, eds.), provides an introduction to the law and economic theory relating to creditors and debt governance. The chapter begins with a look at the traditional role of debt, focusing on the impact of debt on corporate governance and, in particular, the effect of an illiquid credit market on creditors’ reliance on covenants and monitoring. It then turns to changes in the private credit market and their effect on lending structure. Greater liquidity raises its own set of agency costs. In response, loans …


The Corporation As Imperfect Society, Brian M. Mccall Dec 2010

The Corporation As Imperfect Society, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

Corporations are ubiquitous in modern society. They pervade every aspect of our life, consumer, professional, investment activity. Probably, people have more contact with corporations on a daily basis than any other institution, including government. From the South Sea Bubble to the Stock market Crash of 1929 to Enron to General Motors and Countrywide Mortgage, corporate scandals and controversies invite fundamental questions about corporate law. This article attempts to bring a fresh perspective to the question: “what is a corporation and how should the law treat it?” The article articulates a corporate metaphysics rooted in political philosophy. The dominant models of …


Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner Jun 2010

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …


Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings May 2010

Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings

andré douglas pond cummings

In recent years, two inextricably connected issues have received a great deal of attention in both United States political discourse and in the legal academic literature. One issue of intense legal debate and frustration has been that of judicial recusal, including an examination of the appropriate standards that should necessarily apply to judges that seem conflicted or biased in their role as neutral arbiter. A second issue that has spawned heated commentary and great dispute over the past decade is that of campaign finance law, including examination of the role that powerful and wealthy benefactors play in American electioneering. Both …


Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner Mar 2010

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …


Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner Mar 2010

Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …


The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner Mar 2010

The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

When a company experiences financial distress, a control contest often follows. Management fights to remain in control of the company, and shareholders, creditors and others try to influence management’s exercise of that control—or wrest it away. This is not a new phenomenon. The degree of influence now exerted by corporate stakeholders in the distressed context, however, is strikingly different than in the past. Recent headlines highlight that stakeholder control issues are at the forefront of financially-distressed situations large and small. The U.S. government, as creditor, dictated the terms of Chrysler’s and General Motors’ bankruptcies. It also demanded and received preferred …


Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague Dec 2009

Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague

Robert Sprague

This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …


Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle Dec 2009

Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle

Robert Sprague

There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …


Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role In The Corporate Governance Debate, Renee Jones Dec 2005

Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role In The Corporate Governance Debate, Renee Jones

Renee Jones

No abstract provided.