Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Organizations Law

Fordham Law School

Shareholder

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu Apr 2018

From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A company’s pro-innovation needs are often met by the exploitation of its resources, widely defined. The resource-based theory of the firm provides immense empirical insights into how a firm’s corporate governance factors can contribute to promoting innovation. However, these implications may conflict with the prevailing standards of corporate governance imposed on many securities markets for listed companies, which have developed based on theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centered and agency-based theory of the firm. Although prevailing corporate governance standards can to an extent support firm innovation, tensions are created in some circumstances where companies pit their corporate governance compliance against resource-based …


Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The Sec Enforcement Program, Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi Jan 2008

Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The Sec Enforcement Program, Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter Jan 2007

Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter

Faculty Scholarship

All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far from uniform across jurisdictions, possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different …


Bag Wars And Bank Wars, The Gucci And Banque National De Paris Hostile Bids: European Culture Responds To Active Shareholders, Ernesto Hernández-López Jan 2003

Bag Wars And Bank Wars, The Gucci And Banque National De Paris Hostile Bids: European Culture Responds To Active Shareholders, Ernesto Hernández-López

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23.1 And Section 36(B) Of The Investment Company Act, Archie E. Williams, Jr. Jan 1976

Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23.1 And Section 36(B) Of The Investment Company Act, Archie E. Williams, Jr.

Fordham Urban Law Journal

In 1882, the Supreme Court first established the conditions precedent to an ordinary derivative action by the shareholders of a corporation. Now after over nine decades of common law development, the present conditions are embodied in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Of relatively recent interest, however, is the relationship between that Rule and section 36(b) of the Investment Act of 1940 (Act), which authorizes a derivative action by the shareholders of a registered investment company. This Note will focus on one aspect of that relationship--the requirement that a plaintiff make a demand upon the corporation's directors …