Law Commons^™

Reconciling Corporate Interests With Broader Social Interests - Pursuit Of Corporate Interests Beyond Shareholder Primacy, Yong-Shik Lee

William & Mary Business Law Review

A seminal case in corporate law, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., set the cardinal principle that corporations must serve the interests of shareholders rather than the interests of employees, customers, or the community. This principle, referred to as “shareholder primacy,” has been considered a tenet of the fiduciary duty owed by corporate directors. Scholars have disagreed on the current legal status of shareholder primacy. This Article examines the controversy in light of the current state legislation and case law. Regardless of its current legal status, shareholder primacy has influenced corporate behavior and encouraged short-term profit-seeking behavior with significant social …

The Use And Misuse Of Fiduciary Duties: Corporate Social Responsibility And The Standard Of Review, Jonathan R. Povilonis

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article provides a crucial corrective to the “corporate social responsibility” debate, which concerns whether corporations have the obligation to protect or serve the interests of groups other than their shareholders, like employees or customers (often called “stakeholders”). Scholars on one side of the debate have repeatedly presumed that corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders play an important role in protecting shareholders from decisions that favor stakeholders at their expense. Scholars on the other side agree that fiduciary duties provide meaningful protection against unfavorable conduct but argue that directors should also owe fiduciary duties to stakeholders so they may be …

Fiduciary Judgment Rules, Julian Velasco

William & Mary Law Review

Because of the strong moral rhetoric and robust equitable remedies available in fiduciary law, it is not surprising to find lawyers and legal scholars seeking to expand the reach of fiduciary law principles into new relationships and new areas of law. However, expansion often does not work very well because of the demanding and pervasive nature of fiduciary duties. Thus, jurists often turn to the business judgment rule and its policy of underenforcement of fiduciary duties as a way to fit fiduciary law principles into other areas of law. The problem with this approach is that it is based on …

Designing Dual-Class Sunsets: The Case For A Transfer-Centered Approach, Marc T. Moore

William & Mary Business Law Review

Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly, have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policymakers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, ownership- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that: …

A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts Today's Movement Toward Managerialism, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand. Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term. Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate governance developments …

The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.

Guardians Of The Galaxy: How Shareholder Lawyers Won Big For Their Clients And Vindicated The Integrity Of Our Economy, Daniel J. Morrissey

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Securities class actions are the most economically significant form of litigation. Highly skilled lawyers expend huge sums and relentless efforts in these matters but because of the costs involved and the potential for enormous liability very few of them ever make it to trial. This Article is the story of one that did, a mammoth fraud where a jury returned a $1.5 billion verdict that, with interest, increased to almost $2.5 billion by the time the case reached the appellate court.

There the Court upheld the shareholders’ theory that their damages could be measured by the excessive amounts they had …

Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Perfectly Frank: A Reflection On Quality Lawyering In Honor Of R. Franklin Balotti, Leo E. Strine Jr., James J. Hanks Jr., John F. Olson, A. Gilchrist Sparks, E. Norman Veasey, Gregory P. Williams

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay honoring the late R. Franklin Balotti focuses upon certain of the key attributes necessary to practice business law effectively and ethically. Among these attributes are a strong work ethic, the integrity to stand behind your own advice and candidly admit when things do not go according to plan, empathy for how others will view your client’s actions and the ability to communicate that perception to your client, the confidence to change the pace of a transaction when a slow down or time out is warranted, and the ability to have some fun and laugh (even at yourself). Perhaps …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

Lack Of Marketability And Minority Discounts In Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness And Judicial Synchrony In Pursuit Of Equitable Consensus, Stephen J. Leacock

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article discusses the often subtle tasks faced by the courts in construing close corporations law, which is state law. The judiciary in individual states has skillfully managed the invention, continuing development and ongoing evolution of lack of marketability and minority discounts as it strives to honor its constitutional mandate to resolve controversies between minority and majority shareholders in close corporations relating to valuing close corporations’ stock. These controversies arise in the context of share transactions in such corporations. Close corporations are traditionally not listed on stock exchanges, and the legislatures in some states have, in some instances, helped to …

Beyond Crosby V. Beam: Ohio Courts Extend Protection Of Minority Stockholders Of Close Corporations, Kathleen L. Kuhlman

Akron Law Review

This Comment explores the possible ramifications of viewing working minority shareholders as term employees on both close corporation law and at-will-employment law in Ohio. Part I discusses the background and emergence of the heightened fiduciary duty owed by the majority stockholders to the minority stockholders in closely held corporations and the resultant protection of the minority. Part II discusses the current standing of the employment at-will doctrine and what protections exist for at-will employees in Ohio. Part III examines recent Ohio case law that compares close corporation employment with at-will-employment and analyzes the courts' reasoning behind creating a new exception …

Can Peltz Score?: What’S Behind The May 13 Dupont Vs. Trian Contest, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …

Redefining Corporate Law, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

None available.

Corporation Code Sections 309 And 1203: California Redefines Directors' Duties Towards Shareholders, Ernest F. Batenga, Mark Willis

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Shareholder Power, John C. Carter

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Redefining Corporate Law, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

None available.

Ending The Silence: Shareholder Derivative Suits And Amending The Dodd-Frank Act So "Say On Pay" Votes May Be Heard In The Boardroom, William Alan Nelson Ii

University of Miami Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

D & O Insurance: A Primer, Lawrence J. Trautman, Kara Altenbaumer-Price

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is United States Corporate Tax Policy Outsourcing America - A Critical Analysis Of The Proposed Tax Holiday For Trapped Cfc Earnings, Robert Bloink

Villanova Law Review

THE debate about how best to reform U.S. corporate tax policy has focused almost exclusively on making U.S. corporations more competitive globally. But the debate often glosses over tax policy's effect on the ultimate beneficiaries of corporate success and failure—U.S. corporate stakeholders. The assumption often has been that healthy, competitive U.S. corporations equal healthy stakeholders—including shareholders, employees, and the U.S. populace as a whole. However, recent economic research has brought the assumption of "trickle down" success into question. This Article suggests an alternate path focused on enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs in the global economy while enhancing the welfare …

The Misuse Of Tax Incentives To Align Management-Shareholder Interests, James R. Repetti

James R. Repetti

The U.S. tax system contains many provisions which are intended to align management of large publicly traded companies more closely to stockholders. This article shows that many of the tax provisions that have been adopted are of questionable effectiveness because they fail to address the complexities of stockholder-management relations in attempting to motivate management to act in the best interests of stockholders. The article proposes that rather than Congress attempting to identify the best way that it can use the tax system to motivate management, Congress should eliminate tax provisions which subsidize management's inefficiencies in order to encourage stockholders, themselves, …

Power And Purpose In The "Anglo-American" Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

The article discusses the impact of a shareholder-centric and market-oriented approach to corporate governance among public business firms in the U.S. and Great Britain. It mentions that both countries have more common similarities in terms of corporate governance systems and business cultures. It affirms that despite such similarities, both countries' corporate governance system differs on how they relate to external regulations that can affect their relationships among stakeholders.

Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

William & Mary Law Review

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil-piercing. However, neither absolutism nor marginalism …

Irrevocable Proxies, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This short article explores the circumstances under which the power to vote shares owned by another may be made irrevocable. Irrevocable proxies often serve as integral ingredients within corporate governance arrangements because they serve as mechanisms that enable alliances among shareowners or enhance the holder’s voting power in disproportion to the holder’s residual economic interest in the corporation. The rights and duties of holders of irrevocable proxies are best understood against a background of common-law agency relationships, in which agent and principal always have the power–albeit having contracted otherwise–to terminate their relationship and the agent’s actual authority. Courts in the …

Director Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties In A Climate Of Corporate Governance Reform, Nadelle Grossman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Partner To Plutocrat: The Separation Of Ownership From Management In Emerging Capital Markets - 19th Century Industrial America, Christian C. Day

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme That Takes Advantage Of Employees And Shareholders, Susan Lorde Martin

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Provisional Director Remedy For Corporate Deadlock: A Proposed Model Statute, Susanna M. Kim

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.