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Articles 1 - 30 of 90
Full-Text Articles in Law
Delegated Corporate Voting And The Deliberative Franchise, Sarah C. Haan
Delegated Corporate Voting And The Deliberative Franchise, Sarah C. Haan
Scholarly Articles
Starting in the 1930s with the earliest version of the proxy rules, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has gradually increased the proportion of “instructed” votes on the shareholder’s proxy card until, for the first time in 2022, it required a fully instructed proxy card. This evolution effectively shifted the exercise of the shareholder’s vote from the shareholders’ meeting to the vote delegation that occurs when the share-holder fills out the proxy card. The point in the electoral process when the binding voting choice is communicated is now the execution of the proxy card (assuming the shareholder completes the card …
Zooming In: Analyzing Annual Meeting Format Changes Amidst A Global Pandemic, Mark T. Wilhelm, Danielle Clifford
Zooming In: Analyzing Annual Meeting Format Changes Amidst A Global Pandemic, Mark T. Wilhelm, Danielle Clifford
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
Beginning in March of 2020, public companies in the United States were forced to take unprecedented measures to observe corporate formalities while following the government-mandated health and safety measures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Those measures made in-person activities and meetings either incredibly challenging or, in certain jurisdictions, illegal. Because “proxy season,” the time when public companies typically hold their annual meetings of stockholders, followed shortly after the mass implementation of COVID-19 lockdowns and quarantines, public companies that had historically held these meetings in-person were left scrambling to find an alternative means to meet. Nearly overnight, the pandemic caused an …
The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber
The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist.3 I don't intend to squander this opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which has been recently reinvigorated by Strine's work. My argument is this: one underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy's appeal is that it creates a competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the exhilarating tournament that results, …
Towards Shareholder Vote On Equity Issuances, Niccolò Calvi
Towards Shareholder Vote On Equity Issuances, Niccolò Calvi
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Adverse Domination, Statutes Of Limitations And The In Pari Delicto Defense - Application In Cases Involving Claims Of Accounting Malpractice And Corporate Fraud, Laurence A. Steckman Esq., Adam J. Rader Esq.
Adverse Domination, Statutes Of Limitations And The In Pari Delicto Defense - Application In Cases Involving Claims Of Accounting Malpractice And Corporate Fraud, Laurence A. Steckman Esq., Adam J. Rader Esq.
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Effects Of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, And "Privateness" On Corporate Cultures, Donald C. Langevoort
The Effects Of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, And "Privateness" On Corporate Cultures, Donald C. Langevoort
Seattle University Law Review
My conundrum question is this: suppose managerialism triumphed in the governance wars so as to regain its desired level of autonomy from shareholder pressures for boards and managers—would we then expect to see a cultural shift inside corporations toward greater honesty and civil engagement, and if so, why? A helpful diagnostic question is to ask how managers currently construe shareholder and market primacy. Have they internalized it as a value or do they instead resent the demands? My argument here leans more toward resentment, though my contribution is more about how to develop a credible hypothesis than how to prove …
In The Name Of Shareholder Value: Origin Myths Of Corporations And Their Ongoing Implications, Karen Ho
In The Name Of Shareholder Value: Origin Myths Of Corporations And Their Ongoing Implications, Karen Ho
Seattle University Law Review
Part I of this Article analyzes some of the contemporary critiques of, and debates around, shareholder value in order to illustrate why many of these contestations demonstrate underlying gaps or problematic assertions in the history and politics of shareholder value, especially if they are delimited by the narrow legal frames and neoliberal assumptions of corporations. It also provides the context necessary to explicate and ground why shareholder primacy and ownership assumptions are historically and legally flawed, and how financial values and assumptions continue to be championed (and financial power elided), despite the recent implosions of shareholder value. Part II expands …
De Facto Shareholder Primacy, Jeff Schwartz
Mission Critical: How Fiduciary Duties Of Oversight Can Aid Corporations In Managing Stakeholder Interests, Krishna P. Pathak
Mission Critical: How Fiduciary Duties Of Oversight Can Aid Corporations In Managing Stakeholder Interests, Krishna P. Pathak
Upper Level Writing Requirement Research Papers
After several public tragedies, corporate missteps, and catastrophes; politicians, certain investors, and other stakeholders have called for accountability in capitalism, proactive action to alleviate climate change, and performance of social obligations from corporations. The Business Roundtable and World Economic Forum have come out with proposals that signify a paradigm shift to the stakeholder approach to capitalism. Delaware, a haven for shareholder primacy, has permissive standards that allow a corporation to engage in any lawful business activity. However, concerns about fiduciary duties, especially the implied duties of good faith, legal compliance, and oversight, have created obligations for directors to engage in …
A Mission Statement For Mutual Funds In Shareholder Litigation, Sean J. Griffith, Dorothy S. Lund
A Mission Statement For Mutual Funds In Shareholder Litigation, Sean J. Griffith, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
This Article analyzes the conduct of mutual funds in shareholder litigation. We begin by reviewing the basic forms of shareholder litigation and the benefits such claims might offer mutual fund investors. We then investigate, through an in-depth docket review, whether and how the ten largest mutual funds participate in shareholder litigation. We find that although shareholder suits offer potential benefits, the largest mutual funds have essentially forfeited their use of litigation. This finding is particularly striking given that index funds and other long-term oriented mutual funds generally cannot sell their shares when they are dissatisfied with company performance, leaving them …
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
On The Origins Of The Modern Corporation And Private Property, Bernard C. Beaudreau
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP) by Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, published in 1932, is undisputedly the most influential work ever written in the field of corporate governance. In a nutshell, Berle and Means argued that corporate control had been usurped by a new class of managers, the result of which included (1) shareholder loss of control (a basic property right), (2) questionable corporate objectives and behavior, and (3) the potential breakdown of the market mechanism. In this paper, I examine the origins of MCPP, paying particular attention to the authors’ underlying motives. I argue that …
The Modern Corporation And Private Property Revisited: Gardiner Means And The Administered Price, William W. Bratton
The Modern Corporation And Private Property Revisited: Gardiner Means And The Administered Price, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
This essay casts additional light on The Modern Corporation’s corporatist precincts, shifting attention to the book’s junior coauthor, Gardiner C. Means. Means is accurately remembered as the generator of Book I’s statistical showings—the description of deepening corporate concentration and widening separation of ownership and control. He is otherwise more notable for his absence than his presence in today’s discussions of The Modern Corporation. This essay fills this gap, describing the junior coauthor’s central concern—a theory of administered prices set out in a Ph.D. dissertation Means submitted to the Harvard economics department after the book’s publication.
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
A collection of eighteen speeches and lectures, from 2003 to 2018, discussing and expanding on the writings and theories of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.
Berle And Means’S The Modern Corporation And Private Property: The Military Roots Of A Stakeholder Model Of Corporate Governance, Andrew Smith, Kevin D. Tennent, Jason Russell
Berle And Means’S The Modern Corporation And Private Property: The Military Roots Of A Stakeholder Model Of Corporate Governance, Andrew Smith, Kevin D. Tennent, Jason Russell
Seattle University Law Review
The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932) remains one of the most cited works in management studies. Our paper shows that Berle and Means espoused a stakeholder theory of corporate governance that challenged the then-hegemonic idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is to create value for the shareholders. We argue that Berle and Means’s support for stakeholder theory can be associated with their earlier service in the U.S. military, an organization which then inculcated an ethos of public service in its members. Our paper, which is based on archival research in the …
The Dialectical Regulation Of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic Governance In Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The Dialectical Regulation Of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic Governance In Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In recent years, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act - first adopted more than sixty years ago to increase shareholder participation in corporate governance - has been the subject of a flurry of litigation, scholarly analysis, and SEC rulemaking. Most recently, following several years of debate, the SEC issued a significant clarification of the rule, reversing the Second Circuit's hotly contested interpretation of it in AFSCME v. AIG. For the most part, the debates surrounding Rule 14a-8 - including in the latter case - have focused on the scope of the rule's exceptions. This paper, selected for reprinting in …
Maine's Non-Shareholder Constituency Statute, John A. Anderson
Maine's Non-Shareholder Constituency Statute, John A. Anderson
Maine Law Review
In 1985, the Maine Legislature enacted an amendment to section 716 of the Maine Business Corporation Act which added the following paragraph to the statute: “In discharging their duties, the directors and officers may, in considering the best interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and all other pertinent factors.” This amendment, commonly referred to as a non-shareholder constituency provision, is seen by some as affecting no great change in Maine's corporate fiduciary …
From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu
From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
A company’s pro-innovation needs are often met by the exploitation of its resources, widely defined. The resource-based theory of the firm provides immense empirical insights into how a firm’s corporate governance factors can contribute to promoting innovation. However, these implications may conflict with the prevailing standards of corporate governance imposed on many securities markets for listed companies, which have developed based on theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centered and agency-based theory of the firm. Although prevailing corporate governance standards can to an extent support firm innovation, tensions are created in some circumstances where companies pit their corporate governance compliance against resource-based …
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Seattle University Law Review
I want to start off with what I consider to be the statement of the problem. As I understand it, you’re concerned that the time horizons for maximizing the value of an investment vary among individuals in surprisingly wide, imperfectly predictable, and often seemingly irrational ways. And, if I understand your target here, the idea is that a deeper understanding of the causes of this variation might aid in the planning and design of legal and corporate policies. To jump into this, I’m going to give a little bit of an introduction about behavioral biases, and something that I’ve called …
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Economics famously treats market actors as homogeneous. People are homo economicus, rational self-interested maximizers of their own utility. So far, so good, notwithstanding supposed behavioral “deviations” from rationality (more on those later). That people can view their own utility very differently from one another is recognized in theory, but not so much in practice. Also not sufficiently recognized is the extent to which people’s views of their own utility reflect their theories of who they are and how the world works, and that they hold such views and theories not just atomistically, but also collectively—that is, socially.
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be superior, either alternative approach would be …
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Seattle University Law Review
Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance sheets. This Article also argues that we …
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Seattle University Law Review
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the business world and popular press in recent years. Increasingly, popular opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks. Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that shorttermism is on …
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Seattle University Law Review
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can range from milliseconds to centuries. A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares equates to ownership of the corporation. A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to corporate law. These three aspects will be developed …
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Seattle University Law Review
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Seattle University Law Review
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice. If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is …
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
Seattle University Law Review
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a massive impact on everything from market structure, investment philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should be enlightened.
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. This was a world characterized by dispersed and vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers do not own, the corporation. In such an environment, the goal of corporate law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing shareholders with participation rights. The structure …
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer
Seattle University Law Review
It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term (i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to escape the tyranny of short-termism. Similarly, in the recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways which harm both firms and the economy.” In this context, a recent article by Flammer and …