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Articles 1 - 30 of 82
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Recent bank failures have elicited extensive interest about the causes, focusing on incompetence of bank executives, policymakers, bank regulators and supervisors and even uninsured depositors. Yet, before we can prescribe solutions to bank failures, we need to identify the correct causes of the underlying problems. We argue that the problem is not so much with incompetence of executives, depositors, or regulators per se, but rather with managerial incentives.
We provide both a conceptual basis as well as empirical evidence to show that bank executives have incentives to increase systemic risks in order to maximize the benefits of bank bailouts. Consequently, …
The Economic (In) Significance Of Executive Pay Esg Incentives, David I. Walker
The Economic (In) Significance Of Executive Pay Esg Incentives, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
The hottest topic in corporate governance circles today involves company commitments to and pursuit of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) initiatives in addition to the traditional pursuit of profits. One facet of this debate has to do with how to motivate executives to pursue ESG goals. Increasingly, companies tie executive pay to ESG performance, although even strong ESG advocates debate the advisability of doing so. This Article joins the fray by closely examining ESG-based CEO pay arrangements at a subset of companies with leadership positions on the Business Roundtable, an industry trade group that embraced ESG in a 2019 statement …
Executive Pay Clawbacks And Their Taxation, David I. Walker
Executive Pay Clawbacks And Their Taxation, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay was predicated. The use of these provisions is on the rise, and the SEC is expected to soon finalize rules implementing a mandatory, no-fault clawback requirement enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation. The tax issue raised by clawbacks is this: should executives be allowed to recover taxes previously paid on compensation that is returned to the company as a result of a clawback provision? This Article argues that a full tax …
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …
Does Tax Matter? Evidence On Executive Compensation After 162(M)'S Repeal, Gregg Polsky, Brian Galle, Andrew Lund
Does Tax Matter? Evidence On Executive Compensation After 162(M)'S Repeal, Gregg Polsky, Brian Galle, Andrew Lund
Scholarly Works
As part of the most sweeping federal tax reform in a generation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) radically altered the tax treatment of compensation paid to senior executives of public companies. Prior to the TCJA, payment of such compensation in excess of one million dollars was non-deductible except to the extent the compensation was performance-based. The TCJA eliminated the exception so that all senior executive compensation above one million dollars is now non-deductible regardless of whether it is performance-based or not.
This reform provides a natural experiment to study the role of tax law in influencing managerial pay …
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Faculty Articles
This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually unprecedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by providing …
Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu
Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Directors face an increasingly complex environment in which their businesses operate. That complexity can present opportunities for corporations that adapt, and also places new pressures on boards to respond effectively. One strategy for directors to consider is to adapt their approaches to preparing for board meetings by focusing not just on company specific reporting and decisions, but also by acting as the “eyes and ears” for management on key issues for the company. This article makes practical suggestions for directors to consider as they approach their board meeting preparation with this broader view in mind.
Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues
Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.
The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …
Clarifying The Original Clawback: Interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 Through The Lens Of Dodd-Frank Section 954, J. Royce Fichtner, Patrick Heaston, Lou Ann Simpson
Clarifying The Original Clawback: Interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 Through The Lens Of Dodd-Frank Section 954, J. Royce Fichtner, Patrick Heaston, Lou Ann Simpson
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In the early 2000s, major accounting scandals involving reporting violations and audit failures sent the United States financial markets into turmoil. Congress and President George W. Bush reacted to the controversy by passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, better known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), in July of 2002. Section 304 created an explicit procedure, whereby the SEC could disgorge or clawback a CEO or CFO’s incentive-based compensation or stock gains when such profits were based on inflated financial statements later required to be restated to reflect the company’s true financial position. When the stock market …
Intrafirm Monitoring Of Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Intrafirm Monitoring Of Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders currently monitor performance and pay through the market mechanism of public disclosures and share price. Employees can add an effective layer of monitoring by leveraging private information. Employees possess the corporation's entire information content; the assessment derived from this content would be relevant to the board's assessment of executive performance and pay. Corporate employees are also a major constituent of the corporate system and …
The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker
The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly performance shares, have displaced stock options as the primary instrument for compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S. This article examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an investor’s perspective. Notable observations include the following: Although technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive characteristics of options. But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at the money options. Performance share plans can be …
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
Stock Appreciation Rights And The Sec: A Case Of Questionable Rulemaking, Stuart R. Cohn
Stock Appreciation Rights And The Sec: A Case Of Questionable Rulemaking, Stuart R. Cohn
Stuart R. Cohn
A stock appreciation rights (SARs) program is a form of deferred incentive compensation. Grantees are awarded SAR-units representing an equal number of the grantor’s equity shares currently being traded in public markets. SARs provide grantees the benefit of stock ownership without equity interest, investment, or risk of loss. Stock appreciation rights programs offer various advantages over other forms of executive compensation and have grown rapidly in number. These advantages include the availability of benefits without the requirement of monetary payments, the utilization of SARs as an interest-free form of financing the purchase of stock under tandem stock option programs, the …
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout
Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout
Lynn A. Stout
Contemporary lawmakers and reformers often argue that ex ante incentive contracts providing for large material rewards are the best and possibly only way to motivate corporate executives and other employees to serve their firms' interests. This Article offers a critique of the "pay for performance" approach. In particular, it explores why, for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, workplaces that rely on ex ante incentive contracts suppress unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience) and promote selfishness and opportunism. The end result may not be more efficient, but more uncooperative, unethical, and illegal employee behavior.
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
The Political Economic Dimensions Of Executive Compensation Reform: Can The Foundations Of Shareholder Primacy Be Sustained In The Post - Crisis Regulatory Environment?, Dezso Peter Arpad Farkas
The Political Economic Dimensions Of Executive Compensation Reform: Can The Foundations Of Shareholder Primacy Be Sustained In The Post - Crisis Regulatory Environment?, Dezso Peter Arpad Farkas
LLM Theses
What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from performance-based corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the brakes on a runaway train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs. By situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose, corporate governance and the law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social, economic and political environment this project seeks to shed some light onto what really …
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.
This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Nonprofit Executive Pay As An Agency Problem: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, David I. Walker, Brian D. Galle
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze the determinants of the compensation of private college and university presidents from 1999 through 2007. We find that the fraction of institutional revenue derived from current donations is negatively associated with compensation and that presidents of religiously-affiliated institutions receive lower levels of compensation. Looking at the determinants of contributions, we find a negative association between presidential pay and subsequent donations. We interpret these results as consistent with the hypotheses that donors to nonprofits are sensitive to executive pay and that stakeholder outrage plays a role in constraining that pay. We discuss the implications of these findings for the …
Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout
Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Contemporary lawmakers and reformers often argue that ex ante incentive contracts providing for large material rewards are the best and possibly only way to motivate corporate executives and other employees to serve their firms' interests. This Article offers a critique of the "pay for performance" approach. In particular, it explores why, for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, workplaces that rely on ex ante incentive contracts suppress unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience) and promote selfishness and opportunism. The end result may not be more efficient, but more uncooperative, unethical, and illegal employee behavior.
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee
Working Papers
This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy.
If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …
Ceo & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How The Government's Policies Have Encouraged The Gap, David R. Meals
Ceo & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How The Government's Policies Have Encouraged The Gap, David R. Meals
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
This paper examines the role of the U.S. Government in the CEO versus worker pay gap, both in contributing to its creation and the ability to reverse it. To better understand this issue, this paper includes a survey of current U.S. and foreign CEO compensation practices, a survey of theories proposed to explain the divergence between U.S. and foreign CEO compensation, a review of the social and business impact of excessive CEO compensation, and identifies socioeconomic theories regarding the excessive CEO pay trend. This is followed by a review of the history of attempted solutions along with newly enacted and …
Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett
Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett
Jesse D Gossett
This article addresses the issue of executive compensation at financial institutions as it relates to encouraging excessive risk-taking at these firms. First, I examine the economics of compensation and its relationship to risk-taking at financial firms. Next, I take a critical look at compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank (and to a lesser extent, Sarbanes-Oxley) and describe not only what Dodd-Frank does, but more importantly what it does not do. I then make specific recommendations for rules regulators should adopt under Dodd-Frank for the purpose of using compensation plans as a way of reducing excessive risk at financial institutions. I make these …
Corporate Governance Issues, Peter Peterson, John Foster, Jeffrey M. Colon, William Treanor
Corporate Governance Issues, Peter Peterson, John Foster, Jeffrey M. Colon, William Treanor
Jeffrey M. Colon
No abstract provided.
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article insists that such rejection …
Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termism?, Gregg Polsky, Andrew C. Lund
Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termism?, Gregg Polsky, Andrew C. Lund
Scholarly Works
There is an increasingly pervasive view among corporate governance observers that senior managers are too focused on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests. Concerns about “short-termism” have been expressed within the financial industry context and outside of it, but because of the recent financial crisis, much of the discussion has been directed at financial institutions. To combat short-termism, several commentators have advocated executive compensation reform to encourage senior managers to adopt a longer-term perspective. Yet these reforms will likely prove ineffective because of other significant pressures on managers to maintain current stock prices.
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal
Washington and Lee Law Review
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in addition to lowering income inequality and increasing sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for executives …
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …