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Full-Text Articles in Law
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson
Michigan Law Review
In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming …
A Primer On The Theory, Practice, And Pedagogy Underpinning A School Of Thought On Law And Business, James E. Holloway
A Primer On The Theory, Practice, And Pedagogy Underpinning A School Of Thought On Law And Business, James E. Holloway
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Recent policyless and lawless business decisions have prompted the judiciary and legislature to erode managerial discretion and judgment. This Article is a primer on the theoretical, practical, and pedagogical requirements for a legal-managerial school of thought to measure the business losses created by these judicial and legislative responses. A legal-managerial school must provide a theoretical evaluation of law and public policy, a practical integration of legal analysis and business methodology, and a pedagogical expansion of legal thinking to include business information. This Article initiates the debate on how a legal-managerial school of thought can further the study, practice, and teaching …
Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing The Right Vehicle For Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, Joan Macleod Heminway
Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing The Right Vehicle For Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, Joan Macleod Heminway
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Fourth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities &Financial Law, William Michael Treanor Introduction, Jill E. Fisch Introduction, Constantine N. Katsoris, John F.X Peloso Moderator, Brandon Becker, Robert Colby, Richard G. Ketchum, Mark E. Lackritz, Annette L. Nazareth, Mary L. Shapiro
The Fourth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities &Financial Law, William Michael Treanor Introduction, Jill E. Fisch Introduction, Constantine N. Katsoris, John F.X Peloso Moderator, Brandon Becker, Robert Colby, Richard G. Ketchum, Mark E. Lackritz, Annette L. Nazareth, Mary L. Shapiro
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Resistances To Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion Of Qlccs, Robert Eli Rosen
Resistances To Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion Of Qlccs, Robert Eli Rosen
Articles
No abstract provided.
Shock Therapy' For Aktiengesellschaften: Can The Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice And Prospects?, Hudson T. Hollister
Shock Therapy' For Aktiengesellschaften: Can The Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice And Prospects?, Hudson T. Hollister
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act) of 20021 was the U.S. Congress's hasty response to the wave of corporate scandals that had begun to devastate U.S. investor confidence during the previous year. Its sixty-six pages contain a wide range of measures designed to enhance the quality and independence of corporate audits and disclosure under the U.S. securities-regulation regime. The Act applies to public corporations-corporations that are required to file regular financial reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Objections from German corporations and observers were particularly vigorous. At least one German foreign private issuer registered with the SEC has …
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …
Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort
Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article focuses on independent directors and the processes of mutual fund corporate governance. To be clear, I believe (and research shows) that disinterested directors do add value as a form of shareholder protection, and this fact justifies the SEC's efforts to strengthen their role. But they are far from a panacea. While that point alone is almost trite, exploring some of the unique features of mutual fund governance shows why judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to governance in other kinds of corporations. Yet that is exactly what Burks and its progeny have done. …
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, Randall Thomas, John E. Core, Wayne Guay
Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, Randall Thomas, John E. Core, Wayne Guay
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in some detail and offers some counter-arguments. The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of "managerial power." Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies …
On The Nature Of Corporations, Lynn A. Stout
On The Nature Of Corporations, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unincorporated business forms by focusing on corporate characteristics like limited shareholder liability, centralized management, perpetual life, and free transferability of shares. While such approaches have value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic of corporations: their capacity to "lock in" equity investors' initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, than to get out of. …