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Full-Text Articles in Law
On The Frontier Of Capitalism: Implementation Of Humanomics By Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, Lewis D. Solomon
On The Frontier Of Capitalism: Implementation Of Humanomics By Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, Lewis D. Solomon
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Shareholders As Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors Of Corporate Governance, Ronald M. Green
Shareholders As Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors Of Corporate Governance, Ronald M. Green
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
In Defense Of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply To Professor Green, Stephen M. Bainbridge
In Defense Of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply To Professor Green, Stephen M. Bainbridge
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Confronting The Ethical Case Against The Ethical Case For Constituency Rights, William W. Bratton
Confronting The Ethical Case Against The Ethical Case For Constituency Rights, William W. Bratton
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Corporate Law, Lawrence E. Mitchell
Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Corporate Law, Lawrence E. Mitchell
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Accounting And The New Corporate Law, Joel Seligman
Accounting And The New Corporate Law, Joel Seligman
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, And Institutional Investment: Some Lessons From The Robber Barons, Allen D. Boyer
Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, And Institutional Investment: Some Lessons From The Robber Barons, Allen D. Boyer
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Investment Companies As Guardian Shareholders: The Place Of The Msic In The Corporate Governance Debate, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Investment Companies As Guardian Shareholders: The Place Of The Msic In The Corporate Governance Debate, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Comparative corporate governance is both necessary and hard. Recent scholarship has identified the political and historical contingency of the American pattern of corporate governance. The Berle-Means corporation, with its separation of management and risk bearing and the attendant agency conflict between managers and shareholders, is now widely recognized as being as much a creature of the American pattern of law and politics as the handiwork of neutral market forces. This recognition underscores the need to place the American experience in a comparative perspective. Other patterns of corporate governance can provide both insights into the operation of our own and a …
Understanding The Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance And Industrial Organization, Ronald J. Gilson, Mark J. Roe
Understanding The Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance And Industrial Organization, Ronald J. Gilson, Mark J. Roe
Faculty Scholarship
We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system – banks with extensive investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership – we must understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.
What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, William H. Simon
What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, William H. Simon
Faculty Scholarship
Alan Wolfe's thoughtful paper resonates with what I think we should call the Washington and Lee School of corporate jurisprudence.' It elaborates on that School's brilliant intellectual history of legal theorizing about the corporation and on its powerful critique of conservative arguments against managerial responsiveness to nonshareholder interests.
It also shares, I fear, a tendency to overestimate the practical stakes of abstract concepts of the corporation and fiduciary duties. This tendency takes three forms: first, a historical picture that portrays recent developments as a promising departure rather than business-as-usual; second, an assumption that certain abstract conceptions of the corporation (for …
New Myths And Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces The Derivative Action, John C. Coffee Jr.
New Myths And Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces The Derivative Action, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Nothing in The American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Principles) proved more controversial than the effort to develop fair and balanced standards for the derivative action. Only the topic of corporate takeovers seems to evoke an equally intense level of emotion among corporate lawyers. Not surprisingly then, Part VII (Remedies) of the Principles attracted the same attention from critics that a lightning rod does in a thunderstorm.
Unlike other ALI Restatements, however, the Principles also encountered a professional opposition, which lobbied against its adoption, both inside and outside the ALI, on behalf of various outside …
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
No abstract provided.