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Full-Text Articles in Law
How To Prevent Hard Cases From Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware And The Strategic Use Of Comity, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
How To Prevent Hard Cases From Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware And The Strategic Use Of Comity, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
The Bear Stearns/JP Morgan Chase merger placed Delaware between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the deal’s unprecedented deal protection measures – especially the 39.5% share exchange agreement – were probably invalid under current Delaware doctrine because they rendered the Bear Stearns shareholders’ approval rights entirely illusory. On the other hand, if a Delaware court were to enjoin a deal pushed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury and arguably necessary to prevent a collapse of the international financial system, it would invite just the sort of federal intervention that would undermine Delaware’s role as the …
Disney Examined; A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman
Disney Examined; A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman
Articles & Chapters
No abstract provided.
Sales And Elections As Methods For Transferring Corporate Control, Ronald J. Gilson, Alan Schwartz
Sales And Elections As Methods For Transferring Corporate Control, Ronald J. Gilson, Alan Schwartz
Faculty Scholarship
Delaware case law has rendered the tender offer obsolete as a method for purchasing a company whose directors oppose the acquisition. A potential acquirer facing target opposition today must run an insurgent director slate, in the expectation that its directors are more likely to sell. The Delaware courts have not justified their preference for elections over markets as the preferred vehicle for implementing changes in control. Informal scholarly analyses ask transaction cost questions, such as whether proxy contests are more costly than takeovers. This article attempts to break new ground by asking whether there are systematic differences in the performance …
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
Delaware's Intermediate Standard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Delaware's Intermediate Standard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
The courts have long struggled with a standard for reviewing management's efforts to deter or defeat hostile takeovers. The usual standards of review in corporate law, the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test, do not seem adequate when courts must evaluate defensive measures that implicate both management's business acumen and its loyalty to shareholder interests. Because evaluating a sale of the company is a complex business decision, management's response to a takeover bid resembles the normal business decisions that the business judgment rule largely insulates from judicial review.At the same time, however, a hostile takeover creates a potential …
Toward An Auction Market For Corporate Control And The Demise Of The Business Judgment Rule, Mark J. Loewenstein
Toward An Auction Market For Corporate Control And The Demise Of The Business Judgment Rule, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.