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Full-Text Articles in Law
"Least Restrictive Means”: Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Noah Marks
"Least Restrictive Means”: Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Noah Marks
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
This Article asserts that Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. should be at least as memorable as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., and is, in a practical sense, substantially more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that Donahue announces admirable sentiments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression” claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white. In particular, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating …
A Contractual Approach To Shareholder Oppression Law, Benjamin Means
A Contractual Approach To Shareholder Oppression Law, Benjamin Means
Faculty Publications
According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in closely held corporations must bargain against opportunism by controlling shareholders before investing. Put simply, you made your bed, now you must lie in it. Yet most courts offer a remedy for shareholder oppression, often premised on the notion that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority or must honor the minority's reasonable expectations. Thus, law and economics, the dominant mode of corporate law scholarship, appears irreconcilably opposed to minority shareholder protection, a defining feature of the existing law of close corporations.
This Article contends that a more nuanced theory of …
Behind Close Doors: Governance Issues In Private Equity Driven Industries – The Close Corporation Paradox And Its Impact On Private Equity In The Us And Sweden, Kristian Hermanrud
Behind Close Doors: Governance Issues In Private Equity Driven Industries – The Close Corporation Paradox And Its Impact On Private Equity In The Us And Sweden, Kristian Hermanrud
Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers
Publicly traded companies make up only a small fraction of the vast number of corporations operating in the US today. Only about 10,000 companies are traded publicly while there are roughly 20 million corporations doing business in the US. Likewise, over 245 private corporations’ annual revenues exceed $1 billion. Among these, more than twelve employ more than 50,000 employees. Despite the influence on vast amounts of people and capital legislature has, to a large degree, focused on publicly traded companies. The reasons for this stem, in large, back to the years of the market crash in the early thirties and …
A Voice-Based Framework For Evaluating Claims Of Minority Shareholder Oppression In The Close Corporation, Benjamin Means
A Voice-Based Framework For Evaluating Claims Of Minority Shareholder Oppression In The Close Corporation, Benjamin Means
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Shareholders' Agreements In Close Corporations And Their Enforcement, Ricardo Molano Leon
Shareholders' Agreements In Close Corporations And Their Enforcement, Ricardo Molano Leon
LLM Theses and Essays
Shareholders’ Agreements are contractual devices to manage tensions among shareholders of a corporation. These agreements have a wide scope related to shareholders’ interest. Nevertheless, before subscribing a shareholder agreement is important to determine the requirements to make it enforceable. This issue has been addressed in the last twenty years by state corporate statutes following the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law and in different court decisions. Today, shareholders’ agreements will be enforced according to the terms defined by the parties unless the agreement injures non-participating shareholders, third parties or is against public policy.
Separation And The Function Of Corporation Law, Ronald J. Gilson
Separation And The Function Of Corporation Law, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
I am delighted to participate in taking up Professor William Klein's suggestion that we could learn something by attempting a functional typology of corporation law. As a starting point, any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. I want to focus my contribution at the level of the theory that might animate the architecture of this grid. To see what I mean by this, think of the Sesame Street version of Edward Levi's classic, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. The character points at a board on which there are pictures …
The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch
The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch
Faculty Scholarship
MR. BALOTTI: Good afternoon. My name is Frank Balotti and I've been asked to be the moderator for this afternoon's program. And one of the privileges that I get is to introduce the panel and to call them up to speak in some kind of order, I hope. And I hope that you and the audience will participate by asking questions towards the end of our panel and get involved in the discussion which we hope to promote.
The topic for this afternoon's panel is a scholar's approach to corporation law. And we are fortunate to have some scholars with …
"Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power To Liquidate A Solvent Close Corporation In Bankruptcy, Shelby D. Green
"Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power To Liquidate A Solvent Close Corporation In Bankruptcy, Shelby D. Green
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This Article will argue that, in the absence of contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation, the power of the board of directors of a solvent close corporation to file a voluntary petition for liquidation in bankruptcy must be determined by the theory of “reasonable expectations.” This doctrine not only addresses wrongdoing by those in control, but also defines the power and rights of close corporation participants. Part II briefly considers the uses of bankruptcy in recent years and comments on the peculiar occasion of a solvent corporation deciding to liquidate in bankruptcy. Part III summarizes the facts and identifies …
Control Arrangements In Close Corporations, F. Hodge O'Neal, Ronald R. Janke
Control Arrangements In Close Corporations, F. Hodge O'Neal, Ronald R. Janke
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Control Distribution Devices, F. Hodge O'Neal
Control Distribution Devices, F. Hodge O'Neal
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Developments In The Regulation Of The Close Corporation, F. Hodge O'Neal
Developments In The Regulation Of The Close Corporation, F. Hodge O'Neal
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.