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Full-Text Articles in Law
Managing Expectations: Does The Directors' Duty To Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, Lisa Fairfax
Managing Expectations: Does The Directors' Duty To Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This article grapples with whether we are expecting too much from the duty of oversight. The directors’ oversight duty refers to directors’ responsibility to actively monitor corporate officers, employees, and corporate affairs. Directors breach their oversight duty when officers and employees engage in wrongdoing that causes harm to the corporation and that wrongdoing can be attributed to directors’ failure to monitor. In other words, oversight liability holds directors liable for their failure to act under circumstances where it can be proven that directors should have acted and their actions could have prevented corporate harm.
The significance of directors’ oversight duty …
The Role Of Aspiration In Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Julian Velasco
The Role Of Aspiration In Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Corporate law is characterized by a pervasive divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review. Courts often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judgements must be based on the more forgiving standard of review. Commentators defend this state of affairs by insisting that it provides guidance to directors without imposing ruinous liability. However, the dichotomy can lead many, especially those who focus on the bottom line, to call into question the meaningfulness of standards of conduct. Of particular concern is the increasing popularity, in legal and scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty standards …
The Naked Fiduciary, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic
The Naked Fiduciary, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic
Faculty Scholarship
Business law is grounded in the common law of fiduciary duty. Courts and policymakers have been loath to abandon that principle. Yet, particularly in the contractual context of limited liability companies (LLCs), the fiduciary label is illusory and may undercut sound governance practices for those entities. This Article presents an in-depth empirical study about governance provisions included in LLC operating agreements and examines the implications of the data in the context of various types of businesses that might choose to organize as LLCs. The Article uses the data and related case studies to offer a new approach to LLC governance …