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Maximizing The Wealth Of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, Gregory S. Crespi
Maximizing The Wealth Of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, Gregory S. Crespi
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Corporate directors are generally committed to the social norm of maximizing the wealth of their corporation's common shareholders. Their current practice is to simplify their investment decisions by positing a generic fictional shareholder who is undiversified in his investments as the person to whom they hold themselves accountable. In this Article I discuss this fictional undiversified shareholder concept and compare it with three alternative fictional characterizations that differ from it and among themselves only in the extent of assumed investor diversification, and which could each serve this same analytical function. These three alternatives are the fictional diversified shareholder, the fictional …