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What Explains Insider Trading Restrictions? International Evidence On The Political Economy Of Insider Trading Regulation, Laura N. Beny Jan 2008

What Explains Insider Trading Restrictions? International Evidence On The Political Economy Of Insider Trading Regulation, Laura N. Beny

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This article investigates the determinants of insider trading regulation across countries. The article presents a political economy analysis of such regulation that takes into account both private (distributional) and public (economic efficiency) considerations. The model cannot be tested directly because the relevant private preferences and social costs are unobservable. However, existing theories of capital market development suggest that various observable social factors can explain the diversity of insider trading policies across countries. In turn, these social factors should reveal the underlying preferences and social costs motivating such regulation.

The main finding, based on data from a cross section of countries …


The Next Generation: Milhaupt And West On Japanese Economic Law, Kent Anderson Jan 2006

The Next Generation: Milhaupt And West On Japanese Economic Law, Kent Anderson

Michigan Journal of International Law

Review of Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan: The Impact of Formal and Informal Rules by Curtis Milhaupt & Mark West


The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2006

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …


Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen And Economists Do Not, Stewart Schwab May 1989

Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen And Economists Do Not, Stewart Schwab

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Firm The Market and The Law by Ronald Coase