Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Organizations Law

PDF

University of Michigan Law School

Michigan Law Review

1955

Stockholder

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporations - Extent To Which Vote Of Proxy Binds The Shareholders, Herbert R. Brown S.Ed. Nov 1955

Corporations - Extent To Which Vote Of Proxy Binds The Shareholders, Herbert R. Brown S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff; in a derivative action, charged certain directors of the corporation with appropriating a corporate opportunity to their own benefit. Defendant directors moved for summary judgment· on the ground that the questioned transaction was ratified by the stockholders, with plaintiff's stock being voted by proxy in favor of ratification. Held, motion for summary judgment denied. The plaintiff was not estopped from suit even though her proxyholder, the corporation management, voted her stock for the ratification, since she had no notice that the question was to be voted on when she gave her proxy. Gottlieb v. McKee, (Del. Ch. …


Corporations - Preference Rights On Dissolution, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed. Apr 1955

Corporations - Preference Rights On Dissolution, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The capital structure of the defendant corporation consisted of class A, class B, and preferred stock. According to the articles of association, the class A stock was entitled to a ten percent dividend before any dividend was paid on the class B. After the class B stock had also received a ten percent dividend, the two classes were to share equally in any further dividends. The charter further provided that on dissolution the holders of the class A stock were entitled to cash to the amount of the par value of their stock before any payment in …


Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey Jan 1955

Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey

Michigan Law Review

Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years. The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two …