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Full-Text Articles in Law
Fiduciary Ideology In Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, Victor Brudney
Fiduciary Ideology In Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, Victor Brudney
Michigan Law Review
The fiduciary role in which corporate insiders are cast in their dealings with, or affecting, their corporations embraces a multitude of parts. Hence the range of restrictions on their conduct varies from inhibitions as rigorous as those imposed on express trustees to limitations almost as flexible as those governing arm's length dealings among strangers. As has often been pointed out, the characterization of a corporate officer, a director, or a person controlling the corporation as a "fiduciary" does not define his status with precision; rather, it sets a tone to his role and suggests the existence of obligations and of …
Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Examination Of Certain Problems Under Section 335, Roger B. Harris S.Ed.
Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Examination Of Certain Problems Under Section 335, Roger B. Harris S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Stock and securities of controlled corporations may be distributed to shareholders, tax free, in cases of corporate separations which qualify under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A corporate separation is effected by the transfer of part of a corporation's assets to a subsidiary, the stock of which is distributed to the parent's stockholders. Such distributions are generally classified into three categories: spin-off, split-off, and split-up. A spin-off occurs when corporation A forms corporation B to which A transfers certain assets, receiving in exchange, the stock of corporation B. A then distributes the stock of …
Setting The Price In An Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement, David Keith Page
Setting The Price In An Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement, David Keith Page
Michigan Law Review
The stockholders of a close corporation may consider it important to keep control of the business "within the family." This can be accomplished through a restrictive agreement, typically one which gives the corporation or the remaining stockholders a first option to purchase the shares of any departing stockholder. The original owners may also wish to guarantee themselves a ready purchaser for their stock when they die or leave the business. This second objective can be attained by adopting a restrictive agreement which places an obligation on the departing stockholder to sell to the corporation or to the surviving stockholders, who …
Corporations - Liquidation Upon Deadlock In Closely-Held Corporation - Interpretion Of Wisconsin Statute, Strong V. Fromm Laboratories,, Paul Komives
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff, as trustee of an estate, held fifty percent of the shares of a going corporation. An election to fill all four positions on the corporation's board of directors was held. Since a by-law required that directors be shareholders, plaintiff was the only member of his own faction for whom he could vote. The opposing faction, holding the remaining fifty percent of the shares, had four eligible candidates. Votes for each of the four were cast, with one receiving one vote less than the other three. Plaintiff voted all of his shares for himself and also cast a vote of …
Corporations - Stockholders - Availability Of Federal Remedy As Basis For Denial Of Attorney Fees In Derivative Action, Jerome Prewoznik
Corporations - Stockholders - Availability Of Federal Remedy As Basis For Denial Of Attorney Fees In Derivative Action, Jerome Prewoznik
Michigan Law Review
Defendants were directors of Merritt, Chapman and Scott Corporation and of Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. simultaneously. Plaintiff, a stockholder in Merritt, instituted a derivative suit to compel the resignation of defendants from their positions with Ward on the ground that an interlocking directorate existed making Merritt subject to criminal and civil prosecution under federal law. Defendants resigned before judgment. Plaintiff, arguing that its suit was the cause of the resignations and that Merritt was thereby benefited, moved for an award of counsel fees to be assessed against Merritt. Held, application for counsel fee denied. Plaintiff could have achieved …
Corporations - Stockholder's Suit - Necessity Of Demand On Other Stockholders In Derivative Action, John C. Dowd
Corporations - Stockholder's Suit - Necessity Of Demand On Other Stockholders In Derivative Action, John C. Dowd
Michigan Law Review
In two related cases, a holder of common stock brought a derivative suit against the directors of his corporation claiming their illegal acts had deprived the corporation of assets. On defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary" judgment, held, judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff's failure to allege either that he had presented his claim to the stockholders at a stockholders' meeting or that a majority of the stockholders' votes were under the control of the directors defeated his action. Carroll v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.; Glenmore v. Alpert, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 456.
Corporations - Shareholders - Use Of Corporate Funds For Proxy Contest Expenses, Julius B. Poppinga S.Ed.
Corporations - Shareholders - Use Of Corporate Funds For Proxy Contest Expenses, Julius B. Poppinga S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Following a proxy contest in which the insurgent faction of stockholders was successful, the new board of directors paid out $28,000 to members of the old board to cover expenses incurred by them, and also used $127,000 to reimburse the prevailing group. The latter expenditure was approved by a sixteen-to-one majority vote of the stockholders. Plaintiff brought a derivative action seeking restoration of both amounts. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed this judgment. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. Corporate directors may make reasonable expenditures in …
Corporations - Shareholders - Power Of The Majority To Ratify Director's Fraud, Paul A. Heinen
Corporations - Shareholders - Power Of The Majority To Ratify Director's Fraud, Paul A. Heinen
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff, a stockholder in the Kroger Company, brought a derivative suit against a subsidiary of the company and certain officers and directors of both the parent and the subsidiary. It was alleged that . Kroger's directors had fraudulently waived the company's preemptive right to a new issue of stock of the subsidiary and had then purchased the shares for their own accounts at a price far below the market value. The defendants answered that the sale had been ratified by a majority in interest of disinterested stockholders to whom all the details of the transaction had been explained, and denied …
Corporations - Extent To Which Vote Of Proxy Binds The Shareholders, Herbert R. Brown S.Ed.
Corporations - Extent To Which Vote Of Proxy Binds The Shareholders, Herbert R. Brown S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Plaintiff; in a derivative action, charged certain directors of the corporation with appropriating a corporate opportunity to their own benefit. Defendant directors moved for summary judgment· on the ground that the questioned transaction was ratified by the stockholders, with plaintiff's stock being voted by proxy in favor of ratification. Held, motion for summary judgment denied. The plaintiff was not estopped from suit even though her proxyholder, the corporation management, voted her stock for the ratification, since she had no notice that the question was to be voted on when she gave her proxy. Gottlieb v. McKee, (Del. Ch. …
Corporations - Preference Rights On Dissolution, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed.
Corporations - Preference Rights On Dissolution, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The capital structure of the defendant corporation consisted of class A, class B, and preferred stock. According to the articles of association, the class A stock was entitled to a ten percent dividend before any dividend was paid on the class B. After the class B stock had also received a ten percent dividend, the two classes were to share equally in any further dividends. The charter further provided that on dissolution the holders of the class A stock were entitled to cash to the amount of the par value of their stock before any payment in …
Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey
Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey
Michigan Law Review
Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years. The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two …
Corporations-Indemnification Of Management For Litigation Expenses, Chester F. Relyea S.Ed.
Corporations-Indemnification Of Management For Litigation Expenses, Chester F. Relyea S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Two recent decisions concerning the right of a successful director-defendant to seek corporate indemnification for litigation expenses are significant because they interpret not only the relevant statutes of New York and Delaware, but also language which exists in the statutes of several other states and which as yet has not been construed by the courts of those states. These cases indicate the desirability of a general survey of such indemnification practice at common law and under statutes.