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Full-Text Articles in Law
Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost
Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.
Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …
To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael
To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors have a love-hate relationship with the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”—the idea that shareholders might sometimes be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is the subject covered more than all others in courses on corporation law. It is widely litigated, being the subject of thousands of opinions. Yet, for all this attention, it is routinely vilified by the experts. Most commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance.
This Article is an attempt to form a basis for rigorous analysis of virtually every veil-piercing case and to rid the …
Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Act) generally subjects the sale of securities by a person "controlling an issuer" to the same rules that govern the sale of securities by an issuer. Accordingly, before a "control" person may sell the securities he holds in the controlled corporation he must either register them with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) or qualify for an exemption from the registration requirement. While the Act clearly requires that a "control" person either register or qualify for an exemption, it fails to define "control." Thus, the task of defining has fallen to the …